GODS AS ASTRONAUTS **EDWARD MARCOTTE**

THE NATION

DECEMBER 28, 1974 *50 cents*

Coming Around to Socialism

ROOTS OF THE AMERICAN TABOO **Robert Bellah**

WELFARE CAPITALISM IN CRISIS **Michael Harrington**

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EDITORIALS

Walter Lippmann

Across-the-board praise of Walter Lippmann, all of it deserved, has quickly reached tidal proportions and the end is not in sight. Lippmann was indeed a truly remarkable figure in American journalism not merely in terms of output—4,000 columns and twenty-six books over sixty years—but because of his far-ranging personal influence in the world of politics and public affairs, both here and abroad. Though the encomiums are of a volume and excellence that discourage further comment, one or two aspects of his career merit special emphasis.

Lippmann developed early the perfect editorial style. What he aimed to do, and did superbly, was to convey the thought of the editorial in a style and within a compass that did not distract the reader or raise subsidiary issues. The style was of unvarying lucidity and simplicity. He knew exactly what he wanted to say and he said it with perfect clarity. The columns never made the mistake of attempting to tell too much; usually they were limited to a central point. No other editorial writer—and his columns were mostly editorials—has taken such pains to avoid fancy writing, obtrusive quotes, the citing of impressive authorities, rhetorical flourishes, name-dropping and other editorial affectations and mannerisms. The tone was uniformly dispassionate. Lippmann did not impute motives nor did he impugn them; he dealt with what had been said or done. Above all, he paid his readers the ultimate compliment of assuming that they were men and women of reason and intelligence and good will, educable, capable of assimilating his point of view and willing to consider what he had to say in the same reasonable spirit with which he addressed them. He wrote his column first in longhand, then dictated it into a tape recorder to make it more simple and precise, and then edited the final taped version. For precision and simplicity, there is really no better technique than to listen carefully to what one has written. Good editorial writing should have the quality of carefully considered speech.

As to substance, Lippmann's judgments and perceptions always deserved the careful consideration they received from the press and the informed public and at the highest levels of political decision making. The fact that he was right so much of the time added to the sense of shock when he was occasionally wrong—as, for example, in his judgment on the conclusions of a commission headed by A. Lawrence Lowell on the Sacco-Vanzetti case. Another instance, which has not been generally noted, is two columns he wrote from California on February 12 and 20, 1942, which took the position that Japanese and Japanese-Americans should be evacuated for their own protection. In 1968, he wrote Palmer Hoyt of *The Denver Post* that he still thought his position correct: "The temper of the times" made mass evacuation a necessity. Worth noting, in this connection, is the fact that his chief adviser and consultant on the issue was Earl Warren, then Attorney General of California. These columns, incidentally, were quite influential at the time, having been read and circulated by high officials in Washington (see *Nisei: The Quiet Americans* by Bill Hosokawa). But the point about Lippmann's journalism that is most worthy of commendation is the spirit in which it was written; he was, as James Reston notes, always "analyzing, clarifying, explaining and, mainly, educating." He was right much more often than he was wrong, but his score is less important than the enlightened attitude he brought to the discussion of public issues.

An enduring influence on Lippmann was his early association with Lincoln Steffens, who sponsored his career in journalism. Steffens had undertaken to make a writer of him in a year but the fact is that, at 20, when he went to work for his sponsor, Lippmann was already a good writer. Steffens introduced him to the major figures in the Progressive movement: Francis J. Heney, Rudolph Spreckels, Fremont Older, Tom Johnson, Newton Baker, Frederic Howe and Brand Whitlock. And Steffens was, in large part, responsible for his early Socialist phase; Graham Wallas was, of course, another influence. This phase did not last long—it did not survive World War I—but from it Lippmann gained insights that stood him in good stead in later years. In England, during July 1914, for a Fabian summer institute conducted by the Webbs and Shaw, he was furious that the outbreak of the war upset his plans for a walking tour of Germany. He was then, as he said later, "totally unconscious" of the world; no doubt an overstatement, but his intense interest in foreign affairs dated from that time. The influence of his early interest in socialism often found an echo in his writing. For example, in *A Preface to Politics* (1913) he wrote:

> The invisible government is malign. But the evil doesn't come from the fact that it plays horse with the Newtonian theory of the constitution. What is dangerous about it is that we do not see it, cannot use it, and are compelled to submit to it. The nature of political power we shall not change. If that is the way human societies organize sovereignty, the sooner we face that fact the better. For the object of democracy is not to imitate the rhythm of the stars but to harness political power to the nation's need. If corporations and government have indeed gone on a joy ride the business of reform is not to set up fences, Sherman Acts and injunctions into which they can bump, but to take the wheel and to steer. [*Quoted by Justin Kaplan in his fine biography of Steffens.*]

Sixty-one years later this passage has lost none of its pertinence.

Spreading the Current

The expansionists in the power industry were hit with their first big regulatory setback in August when the Wisconsin Public Service Commission ordered a local electric company to alter its rate design in exactly the ways advocated by environmentalists and consumer groups.

In a case which dragged on for two years and which all sides tended to agree had become a "national test case for electric rate design," the commission ordered Madison Gas & Electric to eliminate the traditional bulk-use discount which favors large consumers and institute a "time-of-day" pricing system whereby customers must pay more for electricity during the hours when it costs more to

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produce. Both reforms will tend to dampen the demand for electricity and reduce expansion in the industry.

In deciding to implement a flat rate for electricity—the price remains the same no matter how much is consumed—the commission accepted the arguments of environmentalists that the old growth-stimulating discounts for big users are no longer justified on economic grounds. Moving away from the industry's gospel that growth means greater efficiency and lower rates, the commission noted that capital expansion in the electric business has actually been an enormous financial burden in recent years and that, far from yielding lower rates, it has been partly to blame for the repeated demands by the companies for across-the-board rate hikes. (See "Our Obsolete Utility Rates" by Robert Karen, *The Nation*, March 30.)

Time-of-day or "peak load" pricing has still broader implications. As William F. Eich, the 36-year-old chairman of the Wisconsin PSC, pointed out in his opinion, time-of-day pricing has been used successfully for many years in other countries. In 1957 the government-owned Electricité de France instituted time-of-day pricing for its industrial customers and realized a 5 per cent reduction in the use of electricity during the peak hours. In 1965 the new rate was extended to residential users. In Wisconsin, too, the reform will apply first to industrial customers and will be extended to small users when adequate metering devices have been specified.

Again, the commission based its decision on sound economic, as well as conservationist, principles. During business hours, when everyone is straining for current and older, less efficient generators have to be brought on line to meet the high demands, electricity costs more to produce. In the evening and early morning hours, when much of the generating capacity is idle, demands for electricity can be met at comparatively little cost. The actual difference is so substantial that University of Wisconsin Prof. Charles Cicchetti, one of the environmental economists who specializes in electric rates, expects the new rate design to produce price differences of "perhaps as much as five to one."

The variable rates will naturally encourage consumers to move their use of electricity into nonpeak hours. Industries will be inclined to develop energy-efficient technologies for their high-cost peak-hour operations. The net effect will be not only to save valuable fuel resources but to shape the most efficient use of our power-generating facilities. Because it encourages the most efficient use of existing facilities, time-of-day can eliminate, or at least postpone, the need for further construction.

In a little noticed case in the Washington, D.C. area, environmentalists earlier this year challenged the Potomac Electric Power Company's need to build its proposed Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station. They argued that by instituting time-of-day pricing, PEPCO could meet all of its anticipated demand over the next few years with existing plant. During that time new technologies may be developed which will either eliminate the need for the controversial nuclear fission plants or at least cope with some of the unresolved safety questions.

In PEPCO's case, as with virtually all utilities, plant expansion is needed solely in order to meet the enormous demands at peak hours. If these demands can be spread

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NOTICE

Because of the holiday weeks, *The Nation* will omit its issue of January 4, 1975; the next issue will appear under the date of January 11.

out over the day and the year into hours when there is generating capacity to spare, there will be a significantly diminished need for additional costly building.

All of this brings into sharp focus the ability of the state regulatory bodies to affect our national well-being and the importance of the Wisconsin commission's decision to take their regulatory function seriously. Certainly their latest ruling, whether viewed from the environmental, economic or social perspective, could not have been more timely.

ROBERT KAREN

The Hibakusha Visitors

Hibakusha are survivors of the mini-holocaust the United States perpetrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. For a time they were shunned by survivors of conventional bombing and many concealed their wounds, as if somehow they were shameful. It was difficult for Hibakusha to get jobs. Many were in fact sick; superstition also played a part—radiation damage was thought to be infectious.

While some Hibakusha hid, others began trying from the outset to prevent a recurrence of the disaster, not only in Japan, where protesters demonstrated recently when it was learned that American carriers armed with nuclear weapons were visiting Japan. These humanitarians wanted to arrest the nuclear arms race, to save the Western powers from themselves.

Such was the mission of a delegation of five elderly Hibakusha who visited U.N. headquarters in New York early in December. "Hiroshima marked the beginning of nuclear war," a 69-year-old member of the group said, "Nagasaki must mark its end." A shopkeeper in Nagasaki, he still suffers from radiation sickness. The delegation brought "souvenirs" of the man-made disaster of thirty years ago. One was an album of photographs of the dead and injured, another, a molten slab of granite taken from the 3,000-degree epicenter of the Nagasaki blast.

Their appeal for an international agreement to ban nuclear weapons forever was politely heard by Under Secretary-General Arkady N. Shevchenko, a Soviet disarmament specialist at the U.N.; but for obvious reasons the discussion was not very encouraging to the members of the delegation and the inarticulate millions all over the world who sympathize with their cause. The United States and the Soviet Union have just concluded a tentative agreement which Dr. Kissinger hails as a "breakthrough" and a "cap" on the arms race. The actuality behind the press agentry is a total of 2,400 strategic launchers of all types, and an aggregate of 1,320 missiles carrying multiple warheads for each side. The guidelines contemplate no cutbacks until 1985, though renewal talks might begin earlier. The only certainty is that under the present rules the adversaries can devastate each other several times over —a far cry from the appeal of the Hibakusha.

Since what they were advocating was eminently sane, it received minimal attention from the media. City Council President Paul O'Dwyer came to the rescue with a reception and press conference for the delegation at City Hall. He, and those newsmen who came to the affair, found the Japanese rational, courteous, friendly and not at all anti-American. They share a general realization that the principal danger does not come from the superpowers, which presumably will refrain from wiping each other out in a suicidal showdown. The danger lies in the steady proliferation of nuclear weapons, so that within a few years a country which lacks nuclear capability will have no military standing to speak of. And with the world awash with plutonium, there may be unofficial fingers on nuclear triggers in the most unexpected places.

Men of good will everywhere will thank the Hibakusha for coming to the U.N. headquarters and setting an example of quiet sanity amid the din of the arms race.

Copper and Human Rights

"Human rights" in this context is a euphemism for torture and arbitrary imprisonment by the junta which overthrew (and probably murdered) President Salvador Allende Gossens. The charges, first made by humanitarian organizations and hence not taken too seriously by the U.S. media, were subsequently confirmed by the Organization of American States and the U.N. General Assembly. The latter passed, 90 to 8, with twenty-six abstentions, a mild resolution urging the present military government in Chile to *restore* human rights, "particularly those involving a threat to human life and fundamental freedom."

The United States was among the abstainers. Throughout the controversy over what happened in Chile the role of our State Department has been that of an apologist for the junta—not surprising in view of its earlier efforts to "destabilize" the Allende regime. The United States has continually put forward the claim that the junta was reforming itself, i.e., torturing more moderately and reducing the number of its imprisoned citizens who should never have been jailed in the first place.

Among those who were tortured was a 31-year-old American, Dr. Amy Conger, who taught art history at the University of Chile. Her story is in the *Congressional Record*, December 4, S. 20595. She was manacled for thirteen days, thrown down a flight of stairs blindfolded, stood against a wall for hours, starved, threatened with rape and death, and narrowly escaped being sent to an advanced torture center specializing in electric shock. She finally signed a false confession admitting that she was acquainted with "subversives."

Last summer the Organization of American States sent an investigating commission to Chile composed of representatives from Uruguay, Argentina, the United States, Brazil and Chile. In a 175-page document released on December 9, the team registered charges of "every kind of sexual aggression," as well as beatings and tortures of every description. The junta allowed the investigators access only to the installations where moderate cruelties were committed; they were barred from the more notorious torture centers. The Chilean Government did not deny specific allegations, but in a perfunctory rebuttal asserted

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the report contained "important and grave deficiencies." The Mexican Government retaliated by breaking off diplomatic relations with Chile. The 300-page printed report of a Senate subcommittee dealing with "Refugee and Humanitarian Problems in Chile," contains the testimony of Ralph Dungan, New Jersey's chancellor of higher education and a former ambassador to Chile. He received information about occurrences at "a notorious interrogation center known as Tejas Verdes," where electric shock, varieties of psychological tortures, plastic bag tortures, immersion of the head in water or oil and similar obscenities were routine. This group estimated the number killed at about 12,000, most of them in the period immediately after the coup.

Although the American press has not headlined these reports—Mexico's withdrawal of recognition was given only minimal attention—there have been significant protests in the Congress, notably by Sen. Edward Kennedy and Rep. Don Fraser. Perhaps for this reason the junta has launched a large-scale advertising campaign to convince the American public that they are a benign and friendly crew. The ads emanate from the Chilean Embassy and are of a grotesque crudity. One charges that the widow of a former Allende official was not his wife and notes of the murdered man that he was "found once in the company of homosexuals." Another ad charges that Allende was unfaithful to his wife, deposited $6 million to the account of an alleged mistress and gave a fleet of automobiles to the same lady.

If anything were needed, given the massive documentation of the junta's violations of human rights, to trigger a reaction here, one might think it would be this offensive media blitz. But the junta is probably justified in feeling that, while elements in Congress may be critical, the Administration remains solidly on its side. Secretary Kissinger actually rebuked our Ambassador in Chile for even raising the issue of human rights; the State Department denies the charge but refuses to provide Congressional committees with documents to verify its account.

Copper is in short supply and the junta aspires to make Chile "the Saudi Arabia of copper." The regime boasts of known deposits of more than 100 million tons. It has negotiated settlements with two of the American copper companies whose holdings were expropriated and hopes to reach an agreement with the third (Kennecott), but will not return the properties to their former owners. A dozen or more foreign corporations and consortia are currently said to be negotiating for concessions and perhaps $1 billion in new investment funds may be forthcoming. In the circumstances, the junta may suppose correctly that it can ride out public protests here and that Congress will not take any drastic countermeasures, such as cutting off military aid. But the media blitz does suggest a certain uneasiness.

COMING AROUND TO SOCIALISM

Roots of the American Taboo

ROBERT BELLAH

Socialism arose in Europe as a critique of industrial society early in the 19th century. A significant Socialist movement exists in almost every industrial nation in the world, often going back a century or more. Socialism as an ideology is important in most of the nonindustrial nations as well. Among the major industrial nations, only America has no significant Socialist movement. Although socialism was introduced to America early in its history, there is only a fragmentary Socialist tradition here. The criticism of capitalism, vigorous in most industrial nations, has here been faint and fitful.

Why is it that socialism has been taboo, and capitalism sacrosanct? Is it because capitalism has "worked" in America? Is it because capitalism's beneficiaries have outnumbered its victims? Perhaps, though it has "worked" for some groups better than for others and in some periods better than in others. And it is not obvious that capitalism has worked so much better here than in many other countries where it has met a strenuous opposition. Is the apparent taboo on socialism due to the enormous power of American capitalism to throttle effective criticism? Again there is some truth to such an assertion. There is an old tradition of anti-radical violence in America and there have been periods, such as World War I and its immediate aftermath and the McCarthy period after World War II, when radical thought of all varieties has been severely persecuted. But on the whole, Socialist organization has been legal in America and Socialist thought uncensored. American Socialists have never faced the mass arrests and the total prohibition on Socialist publications that, for example, Japanese Socialists have, yet socialism remains a far more vital movement in Japan than in America. The weakness of a critical Socialist tradition in America cannot be explained altogether by the success of capitalism or the repression of socialism but is in part due to aspects of American culture and American myth.

Robert Bellah teaches sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. The article published here will form a chapter of his The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial, *to be published by The Seabury Press early in 1975.*

Socialism or Individualism

The word "socialism" was coined in France at about the same time as the word "individualism." The two words arrived on these shores in the years between 1820

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and 1840 as contrasting terms. In Europe individualism carried a negative implication, so that socialism had, initially at least, a rather positive connotation. But individualism resonated to so much that was latent in American ideology that it rapidly became the positive term. Socialism, its opposite, could only be evaluated negatively. Emerson expressed the national mood in 1847 when he said, "Individualism has never been tried," and went on to decry the vogue that socialism was enjoying just when it seemed that at last individualism might have a real chance. His position had already been worked out in 1840 when, in criticizing the communitarian experiment at Brook Farm, he said, "I do not wish to remove from my present prison to a prison a little larger. I wish to break all prisons." It should be noted that Emerson was not glorifying something that already existed in America in contrast to socialism. He was certainly not glorifying capitalism, for which the name and the concept as yet scarcely existed. He was expressing his hope for the appearance of a utopian individualism that would be a fulfillment of Protestant voluntarism and Jeffersonian democracy. In a society characterized by such utopian individualism, government would be reduced to those few functions that neighbors could voluntarily agree to without infringing on the full play of individual autonomy.

It should be obvious that such a conception of individualism would not be easy to reconcile with the realities of a society dominated by industrial capitalism. Emerson was ambivalent toward the emerging symptoms of such an economic order, and Thoreau was implacably hostile to them. The ideological issue, individualism versus socialism, came to a head well before industrial capitalism could even be clearly discerned in America, which was not until after the Civil War. The general rejection of socialism in America by the 1850s, after an earlier flurry of interest, is to be explained far more by the victory of the ideology of individualism than as a choice between alternate ways to order a new industrial economy whose outlines were as yet hardly discernible.

When capitalism in America did become ideologically self-conscious, it took shelter under the established categories of individualism, however incongruous that would turn out to be. In the 20th century, "free enterprise," with its connotation of early entrepreneurial capitalism easily reconciled with individualism, became the slogan of the giant corporate bureaucracy that was the reality of late American capitalism. The link between the basic national values and the alleged characteristics of our economy are spelled out by the National Association of Manufacturers in a 1946 book entitled *The American Individual Enterprise System*:

> At the threshold of our national existence we solemnly asserted "the unalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; we fought the Revolutionary War for that right, and adopted a Constitution to guarantee and propagate it. We became a nation of free men not serving political masters but ourselves, free to pursue our happiness without interference from the state, with the greatest liberty of individual action ever known to man. Individuals, conscious of unbounded opportunity, inflamed by the love of achievement, inspired by the hope of profit, ambitious of the comfort, power and influence that wealth brings, turned with . . . vigor to producing and offering goods and services in freely competitive markets. The individual wanted little from the government beyond police protection while he confidently worked out his own destiny. . . . Our "private enterprise system and our American form of government are inseparable and there can be no compromise between a free economy and a governmentally dictated economy without endangering our political as well as our economic freedom."

Most of the founding fathers would not have waxed quite so warm about the "hope of profit" and the ambitions for "the comfort, power and influence that wealth brings," as did the National Association of Manufacturers. But what is striking in the statement is the assertion of individual freedom against the interference of a hierarchical, bureaucratic state, while such freedom is not asserted against the interference of vast hierarchical, bureaucratic corporations, corporations that operate largely outside the normal democratic political process and are under even less popular restraint than state power.

The Site of Morality

There is far more tension between basic American values and the capitalist economic system than is usually assumed. Much as the Puritans encouraged work in a calling, they were always aware of the dangers of making wealth and power into ends in themselves, dangers not only to one's eternal salvation but also to the coherence of the community. But in the 17th and 18th centuries, and even well into the 19th, such matters could be treated largely at the level of individual morality. With the emergence of large-scale industry in the mid-19th century the social and political implications of capitalist organization became manifest, though even today Americans tend to treat social problems as problems of personal morality. But from early times there have been a few who have shown a sharp social perception.

In 1781 Thomas Jefferson in *Notes on the State of Virginia* made an analysis of the relation between economic and political life that is usually placed under the rubric of agrarianism but is considerably broader in its implication:

> Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever He had a chosen people, whose breasts He has made His peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. It is the focus in which He keeps alive that sacred fire, which otherwise might escape from the face of the earth. Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an example. It is the mark set on those, who, not looking up to heaven, to their own soil and industry, as does the husbandman, for their subsistence, depend for it on casualties and caprice of customers. Dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the design of ambition. This, the natural progress and consequence of the arts, has sometimes perhaps been retarded by accidental circumstances; but, generally speaking, the proportion which the aggregate of the other classes of citizens bears in any State to that of its husbandmen, is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts and is a good enough barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption. While we have

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In previous year-end issues, *The Nation* has published a spread of American and foreign cartoons which seemed to reflect with particular vigor and wit the preoccupations of the previous months. The editors have distributed a similar collection of drawings through the pages of this issue because, in this case, they are not only of unusual excellence but pertinent to the articles here presented.

land to labor then, let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a work-bench, or twirling a distaff. Carpenters, masons, smiths, are wanting in husbandry; but, for the general operations of manufacture, let our workshops remain in Europe. It is better to carry provisions and materials to workmen there, than bring them to the provisions and materials, and with them their manners and principles. The loss by the transportation of commodities across the Atlantic will be made up in happiness and permanence of government. The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government as sores do to the strength of the human body. It is the manners and spirit of a people which preserve a republic in vigor. A degeneracy in these is a canker which soon eats to the heart of its laws and constitution.

There is in that passage a notable absence of the glorification of wealth which contrasts sharply with the National Association of Manufacturers' statement. Jefferson is willing to sustain a relative poverty to gain other ends. His glorification of farmers was not based on any mystique of the soil as such. It is their independence, their lack of subservience, that sets them above merchants and artisans who are dependent on customers for their living. Jefferson believed the republic depended on the participation of autonomous individuals, each capable of making up his own mind and carrying his own responsibility. Every citizen, ideally, would be a "participator in government" and farmers were best suited to that role. By 1816, thirty years after *Notes on the State of Virginia,* Jefferson had changed his mind and concluded that manufacturers were necessary for national survival in a period of great international disturbance. But, more concerned than ever with democratic participation, in that year he insistently put forward his proposals for a ward system. The ward was to be a level of government below the county that would involve the active participation of everyone in what he referred to as "elementary republics." He was deeply suspicious of any system that totally delegated political responsibility. He did not lose his original suspicion of manufacturing nor was he sanguine about the future of democracy in America should large sectors of the population become politically and economically dependent. In his correlative stress on individual autonomy and genuine political community, including on its lowest level every individual as an active participator, Jefferson was still holding together the two sides of the American ideal, the individual and the social, that would increasingly come apart in the century after his death.

Orestes A. Brownson, the transcendentalist Unitarian who would later become America's leading 19th-century Catholic thinker, was perhaps the shrewdest social analyst in the period before the Civil War. Rejecting both utopian socialism and utopian individualism, he opted for a balance in the tradition of American thought that went back to John Winthrop. "Community," he said, "without individuality is *tyranny,* the fruits of which are oppression, degradation and immobility, the synonym of death. Individuality without community is *individualism,* the fruits of which are dissolution, isolation, selfishness, disorder, anarchy, confusion, war. . . . What we need, then is . . . communalism and individuality harmonized . . . atoned." Writing in 1840 he saw the greatest threat to that proper balance coming not from socialism but from capitalism. In a famous essay, "The Laboring Classes," he depicted in stark outline what the advance of industrialism was doing to American democracy. He deplored the increasing division of Americans into rich and poor and predicted the arrival of that "most dreaded of all wars, the war of the poor against the rich."

Like Jefferson, Brownson argued that democratic government depends on an essential equality of social position. But the common factory laborer could never hope to exercise the same political influence as the mill owner. The dependency that Jefferson had deplored in merchants and artisans Brownson saw as ten times worse among wage laborers. Brownson, writing before Karl Marx had penned a single of his famous lines, argued that wage labor is



Vadillo, Siempre (Mexico)

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essentially a form of slavery. "Wages," he said in the 1840 article, "is a cunning device of the devil for the benefit of tender consciences, who would retain all the advantages of the slave system, without the expense, trouble, and odium of being slave-holders." He even echoed the argument that some of the Southern apologists used for very different purposes; namely that the slave is in some degree better off than the factory worker since he never faces the uncertainties of unemployment or the pangs of actual physical want that afflict the latter.

Brownson's solution was thoroughly within the Jeffersonian tradition. He wished to build into the economy conditions that would emancipate the workingman from his wage slavery so that "by the time he is of a proper age to settle in life, he shall have accumulated enough to be an independent laborer on his own capital—on his own farm or in his own shop." In order to insure the equality of opportunity ("not equal wealth, but equal chances to wealth") that is essential in a democracy, he proposed to abolish inheritance, for he saw that without that measure all talk of equality of opportunity is essentially hollow. What Brownson did not see—what in 1840 was still far from obvious—was that a modern economy could not operate on the basis of small farms and shops, that it had an inherent drive toward a scale that was simply irreconcilable with the traditional American stress on every man his own master. The curious thing is that Americans have never given up that ideological commitment even when it has become almost totally remote from social and economic reality.

Walt Whitman was a far less acute social analyst than Brownson and in many of his social views reflected his environment. It is therefore interesting to find him in the 1880s saying, at the very moment that the giant corporate trusts were forming: "I look forward to a world of small owners. . . . The creation of a large, independent, democratic class of small owners is the main thing." He called for the "production and perennial establishment of millions of comfortable city homesteads and moderate-sized farms, healthy and independent, single separate ownership, fee simple, life in them complete but cheap, within reach of all." This, it should be noted, is not the dream of wealth, power and influence. It is the late 19th-century version of the old Puritan republican dream of a genuine participatory democracy. And Whitman's gnawing fear was expressed in imagery almost identical with that of Jefferson: "If the United States, like the countries of the Old World, are also to grow vast crops of poor, desperate, dissatisfied, nomadic, miserably-waged populations, such as we see looming upon us of late years—steadily, even if slowly, eating into them like a cancer of lungs or stomach—then our republican experiment, notwithstanding all its surface-successes, is at heart an unhealthy failure."

In spite of a long series of struggles to protect and expand the role of the independent producer in America, struggles led by Locofoco Democrats, Free-Soil Republicans, Populists, Progressives and New Dealers, and in spite of specific legislative programs—the dismantling of the United States Bank, the Homestead Act, the anti-trust laws, the federal loan programs for farmers and small businessmen—the concentration and bureaucratization of the economy has not been halted or reversed, nor have the "vast crops of poor, desperate, dissatisfied, nomadic" and "miserably-waged" been diminished. The emergence of labor unionization, a degree of governmental regulation in many industries, Social Security, and the welfare system have kept the worst consequences of the profound disparities in the economic system, the consequences feared by Jefferson, Brownson and Whitman, from appearing with all their potential virulence. But they have not altered the fundamental fact that the economic system of late industrial America cannot be reconciled with the fundamental American ideology of economic independence as the basis of political order. That ideology we have never abandoned though it has described our social reality less accurately with every passing decade.

Royal Revolutions

If there is a profound disparity between the present American economic system and basic American values, and if many Americans have so argued, then it is all the more surprising that some version of socialism, as the main alternative to capitalist economic organization in the modern world, has not found favor in the United States. Socialism has often seemed merely to compound the evil that is contained in capitalism. Rather than releasing the autonomous individual and placing him in a context of genuine participatory community, socialism has been seen as a system that crushes the individual under a centralized bureaucratic structure even more effectively than corporate capitalism. With the example of state socialism in the Soviet Union since 1917, that argument has been especially hard to refute. But there are concepts of socialism and Socialist movements in the world that reject the Stalinist model. The American aversion to socialism goes deeper than rational argument. It is worth trying to understand the basis of that aversion, for such understanding will instruct us about some aspects of the American soul.

In 1887 Edward Bellamy's utopian novel *Looking Backward* described a society in which all the economic disturbances of his day had been overcome. In Bellamy's ideal society everyone served in the highly centralized economy for a maximum of twenty-two years and then enjoyed a life of leisure and self-expression on a fixed and equal income. Bellamy's book started a not inconsiderable movement of what came to be known as "Nationalist" clubs. In 1888 Bellamy explained why he avoided the term Socialist:

> In the radicalness of the opinions I have expressed I may seem to outsocialize the Socialists, yet the word Socialist is one I could never well stomach. It smells to the average American of petroleum, suggests the red flag and all manner of sexual novelties, and an abusive tone about God and religion. . . . Whatever German and French reformers may choose to call themselves, Socialist is not a good name for a party to succeed with in America.

In his very choice of the name "Nationalist" Bellamy gave an indication of another feature of socialism that he was trying to disavow, namely that it is a foreign ideology, un-American.

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It is true that socialism arrived in the United States in the early 19th century as a revolutionary messianic ideology of French origin. As such it inevitably was seen as a rival and possibly a danger to America's own revolutionary messianic ideology. This rival foreign ideology carried its own myth of origin quite different from ours. Early in the history of the new nation there had been a deep revulsion against the excesses of the French Revolution and a tendency to contrast it with the moderate and humane character of the American Revolution. Such a contrast was stated most vigorously by the early Federalists but was in some form or other accepted by Jeffersonian Democrats as well. How vivid was the memory of the French Revolution and how easily revolutionary socialism was identified with it is indicated by



Seles (Yugoslavia)

the fact that even Brownson's quite explicitly un-Socialist proposals of 1840 earned for him the soubriquet of "Jacobin" or "the American Robespierre." The fact that later Socialist ideologists in America were very frequently immigrants only added to the foreign image.

"Revolutionary" could never be an entirely negative attribute in America and if that were the only problem with socialism it is possible that it might have been domesticated. More serious is what Bellamy referred to as its "abusive tone about God and religion," namely the undeniable atheism and materialism that characterized not all kinds of socialism but particularly the most influential strand, Marxism. This was, and I suggest even now remains, a grave and serious stumbling block. In Europe not only many of the intellectuals but the mass of the workers tended to be disaffected with religion and alienated from the church in the 19th century, but not in America. Even though American intellectuals were ambivalent about the Protestant tradition, they showed an inveterate idealism to which the stress on material motivation of many Socialists could only be abhorrent. Reacting against capitalist materialism such men were not apt to be attracted to Socialist materialism. Indeed one may wonder whether, if Karl Marx had studied a little less at the feet of David Ricardo and a little more at the feet of William Blake, he might not have had a far more powerful impact on English-speaking intellectuals. But whatever was the case with the subtleties of the intellectuals, to the average American worker an ideology that claimed to be explicitly atheistic could only be repulsive.

Though "revolutionary" and "atheistic" would continue to be negative terms used to characterize socialism, it was the attribute of collectivism and statism, in contrast to allegedly American individualism, that would be the central negative image. This image, however, involved a double distortion. For one thing there existed religious, democratic and humanistic forms of socialism emphasizing individual dignity that Americans almost entirely failed to see or appreciate. For another, the American tradition itself was not one-sidedly individualistic but always involved a balance of concern between the individual and his community. When the functions of political community were degraded to a matter of mere "police protection," both the tradition of the covenant community and of constitutional republicanism were subverted.

Inevitably when a dichotomy becomes magnified in such a way that both sides of it are distorted, one begins to suspect the presence of the psychological mechanism of projection. The "rugged individualist" decrying every form of collectivism, above all atheistic communism, as the very embodiment of evil, may be projecting his own dependency needs and needs for community, ruthlessly repressed and denied in himself, onto his alleged enemies. Even granted the unspeakable crimes committed in the 20th century by Communist nations (a close inspection of the history of the century, however, would disclose that such societies have had no monopoly on unspeakable crimes), the morbid anti-communism of the American Right, and the tendency to assimilate every kind of Socialist or even liberal position to that of communism, indicates, I believe, some serious failure to come to terms with the balance between dependence and independence, solidarity and autonomy, that are part of any mature personality or society. This morbid obsession may be a symptom, then, not of the genuine Americanism that it claims to cherish but of its distortion and pathology.

Varieties of Socialism

A quick look at those brief moments in American history when socialism did strike a response tends to confirm the above analysis of the reasons for its more usual unpopularity. The varieties of socialism that attracted a flurry of interest in the second quarter of the 19th century, namely the theories of Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, were not revolutionary in any violent sense; they were easily reconciled with religious and idealistic philosophies; and they each gave a high consideration to individual autonomy. A passage from the elder Henry James, father of Henry and William, gives us the flavor of a socialism that was, for a moment at least, completely indigenized. James was a Swedenborgian transcendentalist and a Fourierist Socialist. On the question of property he wrote in the early 1850s:

> Thus Socialism condemns, after a certain stage of human progress, the institution of limited property. It demands for man an infinite property, that is to say a property in universal nature and in all the affections and thoughts of humanity. It is silly to charge it with

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a tendency to destroy property. It aims indeed to destroy all merely limited and conventional property, all such property as is held not by any inward fitness of the subject, but merely by external police or convention; but it aims to destroy even this property only in the pacific way of superseding it, that is, by giving the subject possession of the whole earth, or a property commensurate with his inward and essential infinitude.

In the first summer of the Civil War James was asked to give the Fourth of July address at Newport, R.I. At that critical moment in history he chose to express his fundamental Americanism in Socialist form:

> I never felt proud of my country for what many seem to consider her prime distinction, namely, her ability to foster the rapid accumulation of private wealth. It does not seem to me a particularly creditable thing, that a greater number of people annually grow richer under our institutions than they do anywhere else. . . .
>
> No; what makes one's pulse to bound when he remembers his own home under foreign skies, is never the rich man, nor the learned man, nor the distinguished man of any sort who illustrates its history, for in all these petty products almost every country may favorably, at all events tediously, compete with our own; but it is all simply the abstract manhood itself of the country, man himself unqualified by convention, the man to whom all these conventional men have been simply introductory, the man who—let me say it—for the first time in human history finding himself in his own right the peer of every other man, spontaneously aspires and attains to a far freer and profounder culture of his nature than has ever yet illustrated humanity. . . .
>
> The letter kills, the spirit alone gives life; and it is exclusively to this undeniable spiritual difference between Europe and America, as organized and expressed in our own constitutional polity, that all our formal differences are owing. Our very Constitution binds us, that is to say, the very breath of our political nostrils binds us, to disown all distinctions among men, to disregard persons, to disallow privilege the most established and sacred, to legislate only for the common good, no longer for those accidents of birth or wealth or culture which spiritually individualize man from his kind, but only for those great common features of social want and dependence which naturally unite him with his kind, and inexorably demand the organization of such unity. . . . The sentiment of human unity, of the sole original sacredness of man and the purely derivative sanctity of persons, no matter who they are, *is what we are born to,* and what we must not fail to assert with an emphasis and good-will which may, if need be, make the world resound. For it is our very life, the absolute breath of our nostrils, which alone qualifies us to exist.

Norris, Vancouver Sun (Canada)

Wastrel

During the 1870s and 1880s the communitarian socialism of the period before the Civil War was almost forgotten and most Americans writing on the subject were pointing with alarm to the possibility of class warfare and destructive revolution that European socialism would bring to America. Henry Ward Beecher saw socialism "drifting in from the eastern ocean like a Newfoundland fog." But in fact virtually the only Socialists active in America in those years were a small group of German immigrants who managed to strike remarkably little response. As Albert Fried has suggested, one of the reasons that the Marxian socialism preached by the Germans was so ineffective is that it seemed to most Americans "to lack a moral dimension." Only gradually when it became naturalized in native and moralistic form did it, in the first decade and a half of the 20th century in the guise of the Socialist Party of America, become a significant force on the American scene. Though its electoral successes were widespread at the local and state level, the success of the early Socialist Party as a movement with mass appeal was very much linked to the personality of Eugene V. Debs, who polled nearly a million votes in the Presidential campaign of 1912. Ralph Gabriel characterizes Debs in a way that neatly suggests his appeal: "Debs, the perennial candidate for President, was primarily an evangelist of a humanitarian Socialist gospel that emphasized the greed of the rich and the sufferings of the poor."

Debs was a Marxist of sorts but he was far more an orator than a theoretician. He presented socialism in a very American rhetoric, full of Biblical imagery and steeped in American history. He touched the old springs of Protestant messianism, for example, when he said:

> The workers are the saviors of society; the redeemers of the race; and when they have fulfilled their great historic mission, men and women can walk the highlands and enjoy the vision of a land without masters and without slaves, a land regenerated and resplendent in the triumph of freedom and civilization.

He pitched his appeal on a high moral level, always eschewing violence and hatred, though himself not infrequently the subject of violence and hatred. "There is no room in our hearts," he said, "for hatred, except for the system. . . ." And again:

> Did the Socialist Party have no higher political ideal than the victory of one class over another it would not be worthy of a moment's support from any right-thinking individual. It would, indeed, be impossible for the party to gain any considerable strength or prestige. It is the great moral worth of its ideals that attracts adherents to the Socialist movement even from the ranks of the capitalist class, and holds them to their allegiance with an enthusiasm that suggests a close parallel with the early days of Christianity. . . .

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Such words may appear naive to an orthodox Marxist but they had far more persuasive power in the American context than any orthodox Marxist has ever had.

The Socialist Party, U.S.A.

The Socialist Party did not survive World War I as an effective political force. Its collapse is only the most dramatic of the many breaks in continuity that mark the history of socialism in America. This is certainly not the place to answer the vexing problem of what went wrong. We can only offer a few reflections. The World War and the Russian Revolution each dealt the movement a heavy blow. The party's opposition to the war alienated the Anglo-American intellectuals who had given it much of its visibility. Debs consistently opposed the war but had for some time ceased to be more than an eloquent spokesman for the movement. He was alienated by the factional politics that plagued the party.

The Russian Revolution symbolically linked socialism with foreign revolutionaries in American eyes. By 1920 the Socialist Party and the incipient Communist Party were much more exclusively ethnic organizations than the prewar Socialist Party had ever been. This development made especially visible the obstacles that America's cultural and ethnic divisions have placed in the way of effective opposition movements. The alliance between intellectuals and workers that seems so essential for a successful Socialist movement was particularly hard to sustain where class differences were compounded by ethnic and racial differences. Critical Anglo-American intellectuals could not easily turn to nor be accepted by other racial and ethnic groups. Ethnic intellectuals were often seduced into general American culture, leaving behind the problems of their own more unfortunate compatriots. As a result the Socialist education movements that were effective among European workers were much less successful here and labor organizations limited their goals to short-run economic benefits. In addition the dominant secularism of many of the immigrant Socialist intellectuals did not sit well with the evangelical idealistic socialism of the old Americans.

The American Communist Party never generated the broad popular support that the old Socialist Party had enjoyed. It always suffered from the suspicion of foreign control. In the 1930s and early 1940s it had selective appeal to many Americans, particularly to intellectuals who adopted their political stance for essentially idealistic reasons and managed to hide from themselves the realities of Stalinism. The collapse of the Communist Party, due to inner disaffection and outer persecution after World War II, was another significant break in continuity. During the 1960s several varieties of Socialist ideology emerged under the general rubric of the New Left. During the course of the decade the militancy of its rhetoric rose as its mass appeal correlatively declined, but as is usual in the history of American socialism it was based far more on idealistic zeal than on class interest. The failure of both the Communist Party and the New Left to link their socialism to any genuinely American pattern of values and attitudes, and the use of foreign categories to analyze American society, are typical of all but a few moments in the history of American socialism.

vonHedemann

"Why Do the Peasants Hate Me?"

That failure guarantees isolation and ineffectiveness even though the economic institutions of the country and its social and cultural life cry out for critical inspection from a radical perspective.

Loss of Autonomy

We must now consider the ways in which the system of corporate industry that has grown up in the last century undermines essential American values and constitutional order. Both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution contain an implicit guarantee of the natural right to property, and that right is explicitly stated in the great Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. As we have seen, private productive property was held to be the essential economic base of a free citizenry by most social analysts of the early republic. The constitutional guarantee of the right to property was long used as a legal hedge to defend corporate industrial capitalism from government regulation. But the fact remains that the great expropriator of private property in America has not been the state but corporate capitalism.

From a nation of individual property holders—farmers, artisans, and merchants—we have become a nation of bureaucratic wage earners, dependent on vast institutional structures that we do not control. The last bastion of American economic autonomy, the family farm, has long been on the decline. In a great agricultural state like California the individual farmer can barely survive in the face of ever expanding corporate agriculture, a corporate agriculture which, in the form of tax benefits, subsidized water supplies, and other governmental aid, receives far more support from the state than the autonomous farmer ever did. What is finally evident in agriculture has long been true in the rest of the economy. It is certain that such corporate management of the economy has made us

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richer than when the economy was largely in individual hands. But has it not, as Jefferson and Brownson and Whitman feared, undermined the moral basis of our republican institutions?

Correlative with the decline of private property, at least private property as the founding fathers knew it and meant it, has come the great concentration of political power in corporate hands, power that is not easily brought to account by any form of democratic process. The copper strip mining that threatens physically to destroy the city of Butte, Mont., is paralleled by the even more destructive social strip mining that is overtaking a city like San Francisco. The sudden uncontrolled proliferation of high-rise office buildings, many of them incredibly ugly and completely out of proportion to the rest of the city, brings in its wake devastating social and economic consequences. The city as an organic balance of economic and residential areas is disrupted. Families flee to the suburbs as residential taxes rise to pay for the services that must now be supplied to commuters. Poverty and crime fill the fringes of the expanding office district. The sterile tiers of vast office buildings replace the tangled cluttered life of Chinatown and other ethnic communities. Opposition is not lacking, but these buildings are sponsored by such giants as Bank of America and United States Steel. The immense wealth and power of these corporations entirely outweigh the interests of the people of San Francisco, and one of America's few beautiful cities slides ever closer to the ugliness, chaos and despair of the ravaged cities of the East.

Decisions that in their general implications are profoundly political are made on the basis of economic considerations and decided by the balance of private economic power. Private profit outweighs public good. Nothing in the current American institutional order is capable of placing proper restraints on such tendencies. Labor unions often cooperate with business, as in San Francisco where the building trades unions campaigned against the effort to establish a citywide height limitation. Regulatory agencies have a tendency to sink into lethargy as their funds prove inadequate to the job they are expected to do, or they turn out to be staffed by men drawn from the very industries they are ostensibly to regulate.

These are not the moral failings of the people involved; they are the inevitable outcome when private aggregations of power have obligations only to making a profit and not to the general welfare. And, whatever may have been the case earlier in American history, it is becoming clear that the tyranny of profit has set us on a most dangerous course. Our economy can survive only through constant expansion, whatever the ecological and social consequences of that expansion. Thus in any economic crisis it is not possible to say: we are rich enough, we are wasting resources enough, let us consider the conserving of resources, more adequate repair of present equipment, improved quality but reduced quantity in our style of life. The economy is like a heroin addict; only another shot of the very profit narcotic that creates a recession will get us out of it. But how many more belts of uncontrolled economic expansion will we be able to absorb before the social and ecological consequences totally undermine our democratic society, not to speak of our physical health?

Nor can we afford to overlook what our present form of economy is doing to public morals and republican virtue. We have spoken before of the balance between impulse and control, liberation and institutionalized liberty, as being essential to a free society. But we have, in advertising, one of the central institutions of our economy, an institution upon which we spend more than we do on all our educational institutions combined, and far more than we spend on our churches, and which systematically and incessantly works to undermine that balance. A century ago advertising as an institution scarcely existed. Today the average American has seen 350,000 television commercials before he graduates from high school. As David Potter has written:

> . . . the traditional institutions have tried to improve man and to develop in him qualities of social value, though, of course, these values have not always been broadly conceived. The church has sought to inculcate virtue and consideration of others—the golden rule; the schools have made it their business to stimulate ability and to impart skills. . . .
>
> In contrast with these, advertising has in its dynamics no motivation to seek the improvement of the individual or to impart qualities of social usefulness, unless conformity to material values may be so characterized. . . . What is basic is that advertising, as such, with all its vast power to influence values and conduct, cannot ever lose sight of the fact that it ultimately regards man as a consumer and defines its own mission as one of stimulating him to consume or to desire to consume.

That happiness is to be attained through limitless material acquisition is denied by every religion and philosophy known to man but is preached incessantly by every American television set. What this does to the large portion of our population who have the resources to engage in the getting game is bad enough. What it does to millions who are marginal to our economy and can participate only vicariously in the great cornucopia is grim indeed, grim in inner disappointment and frustration, grim in the possibility of unrestrained violence. Few societies could imagine themselves surviving very long when one of their central institutions was advocating unrestrained greed. Are we so different from all other human societies?

But the blighting effect of advertising, itself the necessary child of the profit drive of corporate capitalism, goes beyond its own message to what it does to the culture, or what passes as such, for which it pays. Advertising money goes to whatever has the widest and most emotionally powerful appeal, to television rather than to magazines, and to those television programs that cater to unrestrained violence and insinuating sexuality rather than those that make any demand on the mature intellect or moral sensitivity. Thus the present American economic system, through one of its chief institutions, seems to be dedicated to the propagation of every one of the classic vices of mankind and to the relentless undermining of the values and virtues upon which this nation is built.

And what are the benefits that we are supposed to have

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gained from this insatiable economic system? Prosperity, abundance, wealth. Even leaving aside the question of the uneven distribution of this wealth, we may still raise the question as to whether wealth is the unalloyed good or poverty the unalloyed evil that American society at present believes them to be. We tend to define poverty as a situation of material deficit. That, however, outside the significant but still quite small percentage of the population that is genuinely hungry, is not the real reason that poverty is unbearable. Poverty is a social and political status involving vulnerability to political and even police intervention in one's life and the lack of any effective power to assert one's wishes and needs. Poverty is bad mainly because it is a condition of powerlessness, not because, in America at least, it involves stark material want. When poverty is chosen, when it is a voluntary status, undertaken for some moral or religious end, it is often a state of joy rather than of suffering, as in the case of Thoreau at Walden, the Peace Corps worker, or the inhabitant of a rural commune. Where it does not have the meaning of political vulnerability and defenselessness, a life of material simplicity can be deeply rewarding and is indeed increasingly being chosen by America's young. There is every reason to believe that a life of material austerity, of pride and pleasure in the quality of workmanship rather than in the amount consumed, a life lived in a warm and supportive community, would be far healthier for our society, ecologically and sociologically, than our present dominant pattern of ever accelerating consumption. But our economy could not survive a mass turn to voluntary poverty, however much our republican morality might be improved by such a turn, and our economy exerts all of its enormous power to prevent such a turn. I submit that of the several critical features of our present social situation this is the most decisive.

I do not know whether some sort of decentralized democratic socialism can supply a healthier economic base for the kind of change that seems necessary if we are to continue as a society of free men and women. I suspect that it can. I see no advantage in a precipitate shift from a bad system to one that we are not reasonably assured will not after all be worse. But it is time, it seems to me, for those who see the serious pass to which our society has come, and the major contribution our present economic system has made to our present troubles, to put aside the baling wire and paper clips of liberal tinkering and consider whether much more drastic changes may not be needed. I am sure that the socialism being preached by the radical sectarians on the far Left, modeled on the ideas of Fidel Castro or the thought of Mao Tse-tung, leaders of two societies about as different from the United States as it is possible to be, is not the answer. But I am also convinced that serious men, responsible men, concerned with the survival of our society in some form of recognizable continuity with its past, must with all due care and deliberation, turn now to the social and political drawing boards in order to draw up proposals of far-reaching scope to meet the far-reaching problems in which we are embroiled. I suspect that our difficulties will soon become so critical that even respected statesmen will disregard the taboos of the past and begin talking about and helping to delineate a distinctively American socialism.

With Henry James (Sr.) we can perhaps look forward to the day when what he called "limited property" is superseded and we come into our inheritance of the "whole earth." Emerson stated the issue clearly when he wrote:

> As long as our civilization is essentially one of property, of fences, of exclusiveness, it will be mocked by delusions. Our riches will leave us sick; there will be bitterness in our laughter, and our wine will burn our mouth. Only that good profits which we can taste with all doors open, and which serves all men.

Not that that openness will be easy to attain. There are enormous concentrations of economic, political and technological power that will react harshly to any challenge. Even when those who profit from the present economic organization of American society have lost confidence in their own vision, even when they see ever more clearly the catastrophe that the single-minded pursuit of wealth and power is creating, they will not easily relinquish their power. Not only clear rational alternatives to the present irrational economic order are needed; political organization, whether in an old structure like the Democratic Party or in some new structure, will be needed. And that organization, that movement, must be broad enough and deep enough to engage millions of Americans from a variety of cultural backgrounds at the deepest level of their personality. For that the Socialist vision must be linked once again, as it was for Henry James (Sr.) and Eugene Debs, with a vision that is moral and religious as well as political. □



Vadillo, Siempre (Mexico)

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Welfare Capitalism in Crisis

MICHAEL HARRINGTON

Our history is turning a corner. The forty-year epoch within the framework created by the New Deal is ending in the midst of crises, both international and domestic, which may well be as profound as those that shattered the old order in the 1930s. The liberalism of the mass democratic Left must turn now in a much more Socialist direction.

Even the Establishment senses the *status quo* quaking beneath its feet. Robert McNamara, president of the World Bank, told the International Monetary Fund in the fall of this year that a billion people, mostly Asians and Africans, are in danger of starving to death. Henry Kissinger asserts that "If we do not get a recognition of our interdependence, the Western civilization that we now have is almost certain to disintegrate." The Secretary of State sounds like a convert to Marxism as he explains his forebodings: that democracy cannot withstand the tensions of sustained inflation; that our governmental institutions are only as sound as the economy which undergirds them. *The Economist* (London) speculates on the possibility of military dictatorship in Britain; a shocked *New York Times* prophesies that "the oil producing states of the Middle East will become the center of world wealth and power."

The Establishmentarians are surprised by all these instabilities in a world they thought they had mastered; Democratic Socialists are not. Indeed, events confirm two of their deepest convictions: that the American and global systems are beset by explosive contradictions, and that the democratization of economic power is urgently required to achieve domestic and international social priorities.

Secretary Kissinger is right: interdependence has most certainly become a matter of life and death for this planet. But he is utterly wrong in his tacit assumption that interdependence can be achieved by shrewd negotiation, without changing an obsolete and disastrous distribution of power at home and abroad. There will either be a ranging, democratic transformation of outlived institutions or we will surely face the catastrophes which the frightened Center dreads.

American welfare capitalism cannot meet this challenge in any progressive way. It can, and will, deal with it, if the democratic Left does not present a positive alternative, by forcing the working people, the poor and even a substantial section of the middle class to pay for the solution.

This welfare capitalism emerged in response to the breakdown of *laissez-faire* capitalism in the Great Depression and it has unquestionably improved the lot of the millions of working men and women who struggled for it. That is why Socialists, along with the rest of the democratic Left, unambiguously defend its gains. But this system is at the same time a cause of the crises of the 1970s. That is so, not because it is modestly concerned with the welfare of the people but because it subordinates that excellent purpose to big-business priorities. It is founded on the erroneous proposition that the corporate infrastructure is basically sound, if only the government will smooth out the ups and downs of the economic cycle and provide custodial care for those whom the private sector rejects. That approach displays a minimal humanity that is an advance over the inhumanity of the American system before the New Deal, but it is totally inadequate as a means to confront the urgent needs of the last quarter of this tumultuous century.

Michael Harrington is professor of political science, Queens College. His most recent books include Socialism *and* Fragments of the Century *(both published by Saturday Review Press). He is chairman of the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee.*

After the Cold War

Before turning to the crisis of welfare capitalism itself, it is necessary to define, however briefly, the international setting in which it takes place. First, the cold war is winding down.

The cold war dominated world and American politics from 1945-46 to the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1963. In those years, the United States was the unquestioned political and economic leader of the West and the international money market operated on the dollar standard. The Soviet Union occupied an analogous position in the Communist bloc, even though centrifugal forces asserted themselves quite early in Yugoslavia, East Germany, Poland and Hungary, long before the momentous Sino-Soviet break. But however many qualifications would be required in a complete survey, the central fact stands: the Soviet-American conflict was the organizing focus of global politics for almost twenty years.

With the Moscow treaty there came new tendencies toward détente, even though they occurred in fits and starts and the old reflexes persisted. In 1968, for instance, the Russians brutally suppressed a bid for freedom in Czechoslovakia and claimed a Stalinist hegemony in Eastern Europe; in the early 1970s, they played traditional power politics in the Middle East, arming the Arab countries against Israel. The United States continued its unconscionable military intervention in Indochina until 1973, even though the terms negotiated then could have been arrived at years—and tens of thousands of lives—earlier. (And in 1974, the Ford Administration was still seeking more than $1 billion in aid for the Saigon dictatorship.) Moreover, as its troops were leaving Vietnam, America helped to overthrow the democratically elected Allende government in Chile.

So there are still powerful cold-war factions in both Washington and Moscow. Even more to the point, détente has thus far produced only the most minimal beginnings of nuclear disarmament. The United States and the Soviet Union remain quite capable of blowing up each other and a good part of the planet; India as well as China, France and Britain have joined the nuclear club, and it could well expand again tomorrow. In short, the big powers have decided only to back off from the brink of a holocaust, an agreement as insufficient as it is wel-

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come. A vigorous policy of real disarmament remains essential to survival.

But however inadequate and even ambiguous the détente is thus far, it has already had a profound effect on the domestic American scene, which is what chiefly concerns us here. From the end of World War II to the very recent past, cold-war issues—and the military-industrial complex which they rationalized—have dominated our politics. They are no longer paramount. The political and economic unity of the Western world, based upon collective security against communism, had begun to erode in the 1960s when the capitalisms which America helped to restore in Western Europe and Japan began to compete vigorously against their old patron. And now, in the United States and throughout the Western bloc, domestic economic issues have taken on decisive political significance.

Energy: Creating a Crisis

The second major component of the new world situation is energy. A turning point had been reached even before the boycott organized by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973. It is thus quite wrong to blame the present woes of America and the other major capitalist powers on that new cartel. Indeed, the vulnerability of the United States in this area was created by the hunger of the oil corporations for profit. OPEC only took advantage of a situation which forces within American society had worked systematically to manufacture.

Still, OPEC's action did have an independent, and very significant, effect of its own. Tens of billions of dollars are now being transferred from the West to the oil nations. As a result, advanced capitalism is committing the most heinous of capitalist sins—it is living on capital. The more powerful of these nations, above all the United States with its abundant reserves of coal, could find an isolationist path out of this crisis, but the very existence of the world money market is now threatened, and countries like Italy and Britain are faced with desperate economic and political challenges. In the Third World, the situation is even more perilous, for the skyrocketing price of oil not only threatens their nascent industrial sectors, but, by making fertilizer more expensive, menaces agricultural production and raises the specter of mass starvation.

Under these circumstances, the American Establishment is suffering a crisis of nerve and faith and its Kissingers speculate on the end of democracy, if not of civilization itself. In the last great crisis of the system, during the 1930s, freedom and peace were indeed the victims of capitalist collapse, Nazi Germany being the most monstrous case in point. Europe and the United States improvised a solution to that challenge: military struggle against fascism and the creation of the welfare state. This left intact an ameliorated, modernized structure of injustice, but it did generate a consensus that lasted for forty years in the West. Now that solution is beginning to unravel—first of all and most dramatically in the poorest of the advanced nations, like Italy, but not there alone.

The United States has suffered a marked deterioration of urban life, an intolerable shoddiness in public sector areas like transportation, a savaging of the environment, an increase in poverty, a pervasive fear of violence and a concomitant decline in social solidarity at every level of the society. At the height of its powers, this nation is perhaps even more psychically distressed than it was at the bottom of the Great Depression.

One need not accept these things as inevitable; there is a specifically Socialist analysis of why they came to pass and how we can begin to cope with them. The answer is not to retreat from democracy, but to deepen it, to give it social and economic content. America cannot

Oliphant, Denver Post

All God's Chillun Got N-Power

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do this within its own boundaries, for it is part of an increasingly interdependent world. But we must begin here, and that is our point of departure.

The Keynesian Dilemma

America's present internal crises arise out of the very nature of the capitalist system. At first glance, that proposition seems implausible. The energy crisis appears to be the result of OPEC policies, not of the American system; the inflationary pressure of worldwide demand for food is hardly of this country's devising, and the consequences of devaluing the dollar may be seen as a passing episode. It might be said that the inherent inflationary tendencies of the Keynesian management of the economy are somehow structural, but that hardly adds up to an indictment of the society's foundations.

But in fact all of these developments are aspects of an American capitalism in which government intervention normally supports private, corporate priorities. They are not inevitable, in some neatly determinist sense—the system usually has a number of sophisticated options—but they are characteristically and historically products of a specific and contradictory formation of welfare capitalism.

First, consider the energy crisis as a typical creation of late capitalist society. The United States Government had begun to intervene on behalf of the oil industry as early as World War I, but the decisive moment from the point of view of the current situation came in the midst of World War II. It was then that Washington became alarmed by its possible strategic dependence upon external supplies and looked toward the Middle East for a solution. Some New Dealers urged a public oil corporation as an instrument of national policy, but they were beaten back by a coalition of liberals (who feared the imperialist potential of such an enterprise) and corporate conservatives. The victors prevailed on the nation to intervene in their behalf—against the British, not the Nazis—in Saudi Arabia, but they retained the control and the profits. The prototypal decision was thus made: private corporations were made the pampered and protected instrument of public policy.

This trend continued in 1950 when it was decided to channel cold-war aid to conservative Middle Eastern powers by way of subsidizing the taxes which American oil companies paid to them. This was done by deducting all foreign taxes from American taxes, and is one of the main reasons why the American companies pay practically no taxes at home. Additional subsidies took the form of the depletion allowance and the treatment for tax purposes of drilling expenses. Then, under Eisenhower, the government installed a new import quota program to protect expensive American oil, at a multibillion-dollar expense to the consumer, and put a premium on exploiting this country's high-cost (and high-profit) resources at a time when cheap energy was available without political strings on the world market.

These policies were compounded by government-corporate promotion of energy consumption in the most wasteful fashion, with no regard to environmental or long-range economic and strategic consequences. A federal highway program poured tens of billions of dollars into subsidizing large private cars and affluent suburbs, while mass transit and the central cities deteriorated and the problems of the poor and minorities were increased at the taxpayers' expense. Meanwhile, the oil corporations, whose monopoly of every source of energy allowed them to control the nation's basic allocation decisions, ignored the abundant coal deposits in the United States because they were not sufficiently profitable. And they poured their money into overseas investments, rather than develop alternate energy technologies at home, because the tax code—which is to say the country's subsidized public policy—made that more profitable.

It would be hard to imagine a clearer sequence of specifically capitalist actions. Our consumption was expanded under corporate guidance with enormous federal aid, but without serious public planning, concern for social consequences or any higher goal than maximum profit. This was done, to be sure, in a sophisticated, neo-capitalist fashion that is decades distant from *laissez faire*, but at its core is an utterly old-fashioned rapacity.

Second, a food crisis of global dimensions now threatens starvation in the "Fourth World" of the desperately poor, as well as inflation in the United States. The standard explanation of this situation is that the growing affluence of the world has been bidding for finite stocks of food. The reality is analogous to that of the energy crisis: our plight is the result of government solicitude for the profits of agribusiness. Consequently, as C.P. Snow predicted some years ago, Americans on their color television sets may soon watch one-third of the world starve to death.

The current situation has its roots in the 1930s, when a specifically capitalist form of economic crisis devastated the farm sector. There was "overproduction" of food at a time when millions of Americans went hungry—i.e., there was "too much" food, given the pathetic level of consumer demand in a nation with a quarter of its workers on the streets. So the government subsidized a program of holding land out of production, even of destroying crops and animals. This was supposed to keep prices high, but it had nothing to do with feeding the people. It has persisted until now, though for short-term reasons most restraints were taken off agricultural output during the last year.

Even when the United States used its agricultural surpluses to feed people abroad, it did so according to Pentagon and State Department priorities. As the National Farmers Union pointed out in 1974, as "Food for Peace" declined, "Food for War" increased. By 1973, one-third of the "Food for Peace" shipments went to support military operations in Vietnam and Cambodia; and more than half went to these and other military-related recipients.

One result of these federal policies was that most subsistence farmers were driven from the land, since the payments were for market crops only and rewarded the giant producer most of all. Thus, an oil corporation—Tennessee Gas and Transmission Co., renamed Tenneco—owns a large part of Kern County, California where, with fertilizers from its own plant, tractors from one of its companies, fuel from its own refineries, it produces vegetables which it sends to market outlets it runs in conjunction with its service stations. Processing is similarly dominated by big business. Campbell sells 90 per cent of America's soup; four companies have cornered 90 per cent of the breakfast cereal market; Del Monte controls fruit and

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Gerber baby food. According to the Federal Trade Commission, the less-than-competitive pricing of these giants cost the consumer $2 billion in 1972; a Department of Agriculture study found that only 6 per cent of the rise of food costs from 1952 to 1971 went to farmers, while 94 per cent was caused by increased marketing costs.

Farm exports also are big business, dominated by giant firms like Cargill. In October 1974, the Kansas City Board of Trade reported that growers were holding back on 60 per cent of the wheat crop, hoping that prices would go higher. This was probably a reaction to 1972, when the exporters bought American grain cheap, with government help, and then sold it to the Russians at a huge profit.

A year ago the enormously powerful agribusiness interests got the government to lift restrictions on production so that they could take better advantage of the international demand. But they and their spokesman, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, refuse even to consider anything other than rationing by the purse. They prefer to speculate on the misery of the billion people who are in danger of starving to death in the immediate future. And if "surpluses" develop again in a hungry world, they will go back to planned, subsidized and profitable scarcity.

Here, as in the case of the energy crisis, it is clear that a government policy of maximum profit is the basic cause of the tragic situation which America and the world now confront. It is not merely, or primarily, the growth of world population and the natural limitations of food production which threaten us; it is these factors as they are shaped and distorted for corporate gain in a system which puts public power at the service of private greed.

The third and fourth constituents of the present crisis—devaluation and Keynesian management of the economy in general—are obviously aspects of a single phenomenon. In both cases, the very structure of welfare capitalist society is involved.

Historically, capitalism had a marvelously effective instrument for dealing with imbalances of inflation: depression. But then, in response to the catastrophic collapse of the system in the 1930s, the Socialist movement in Europe and the liberals in America demonstrated that government stimulation of the economy through deficit spending could put jobless people and unused capacity back to work. Accordingly, in the post-World War II period, and particularly after the relative success of the Kennedy-Johnson initiatives in the 1960s, it was widely believed that countercyclical policies could guarantee full employment within a context of stable prices. Warnings from Keynes and some of his associates that the success of that solution would create new, inflationary problems were widely ignored. For the Keynesian revolution had deprived capitalism of one of its most important—and destructively antisocial—mechanisms for survival. The Western labor movements of the 1960s and 1970s had made a return to the 1930s politically unthinkable.

During the 1950s under the Eisenhower administration the government prevented the economy from entering a depression, but it sponsored chronic recessions in accordance with conservative principle. Business achieved relative price stability at the expense of intolerable unemployment for workers and worsening conditions for the poor. When Kennedy took office in 1961, he did not face a disaster of the proportions that had confronted Roosevelt in 1933, but the basic problem of the economy was, in a sense, old-fashioned: how to reduce joblessness and put idle plants back into production. Kennedy, and then Johnson, approached this issue with the most conservative variant of Keynesianism: by tax cuts, accelerated depreciation and other devices which promoted the private interest of the corporate rich in order to further the common good.

This strategy worked, relatively speaking. Unemployment was reduced because of it—and because of the escalating American intervention in Vietnam. But then that military outrage began to have inflationary consequences. The usual optimistic estimates about "light at the end of the tunnel" and the unwillingness of the White House to admit, through a forthright demand for higher taxes, that it had taken the nation into a war, led to a reckless overstimulation of the economy. When Nixon took over in 1969, he prepared to deal with this problem in the classic manner: to defeat inflation through increased unemployment, tight money and the like. By the fall of 1970, he had achieved a simultaneous recession-inflation which was a basic reason for Republican defeats in the Congressional midterm elections.

So in August of 1971, Nixon responded. He devalued the dollar to cheapen American goods on the world market and imposed wage and price controls to hold down prices. The devaluation helped power a boom in 1972 that was expressly designed to return Nixon to the White House. That same personal ambition caused him—all of his conservative cant to the contrary—to pursue extremely expansionist fiscal and monetary policies for a year before his re-election and then, when he won, to tighten the screws in the name of his supposedly orthodox principles.

Political Economics

Several crucial aspects of the new period in which we live are obvious in all of this. First, Nixon managed the wage and price controls on behalf of corporate interests—i.e., wages were indeed kept down but prices and profits soared. That is a systemic tendency of welfare capitalist societies, although Nixon, as an opportunistic rightist, made the very worst of it. Second, national economic management has now been thoroughly politicized. Nixon imported the tactics, first employed by the British Tories, of expansionist policies before an election and contraction immediately after. One speaks of the contributions of ITT, the Milk Fund and other corporate payoffs to the Nixon campaign; one should include in that list the multi-billion-dollar consequences of devaluation and fiscal and monetary stimulus in 1971-72.

Third, and most important for our purposes, these political developments exacerbated, but did not create, a much more deep-lying tendency toward inflation which is built into the very structure of welfare capitalism. Such a society cannot politically risk depression on the scale required to bring down prices, particularly since the latter are administered in the oligopoly sector and do not decline just because demand drops off. At the same time, full employment policies strengthen the trade union movement which is then able to win wage increases. However, the largest corporations are able to pass these new costs on to the consumers, thus setting in motion an inflationary

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spiral. So workers find that they must go on strike simply to protect their real wages, or to catch up on the losses they have already suffered. And even though the giant companies can impose many of their wage costs on the public, profits decline. They fell from 11 to 9.2 per cent of GNP between 1966 and 1969, a period when unemployment hit 3.4 per cent, its low point in the decade. That is why business welcomed Richard Nixon's "old-time religion" in 1969 when the new President decided to buy price stability and increased profitability at the cost of several million jobs.

Behrendt, Het Parool (Amsterdam)

Yet Nixon's carefully managed recession did not do the job. Had he allowed it to go deep enough to accomplish corporate purposes, he most certainly would have lost the election in 1972. That explains the controls and expansionary federal posture of the "New Economic Policy" of 1971-73.

So welfare capitalism faces new structural problems which arise out of its remedies for its old structural problems. It can, through deficit financing, put unemployed people and resources back to work, though it tends to do so in a way to enhance the wealth and power of the corporate rich. Moreover, big business uses the government-financed prosperity for its own purposes which are, more often than not, anti-environmental and anti-social. So private sector growth becomes a public cost (or, as Richard Titmus puts it, the "diswelfare" of the corporations requires a welfare state paid for by the people). And yet, with employment and living standards on the rise, most citizens ignore the dangerous long-range trends set in motion by their extremely modest immediate gains.

In the 1970s, these gains culminated in a double-digit inflation which was simultaneously the worst recession of the postwar era. In the process, the last generation's solution became this generation's problem. That can be seen in two contrasting developments, both of them by-products of that Keynesian politicalization of the economy which was a great advance for America. In 1966-67, Johnson ran a deficit at an annual rate of $14.7 billion because he refused to ask for taxes to pay for the undeclared war in Indochina. This let loose powerful inflationary forces. But when Nixon responded in 1969 with the traditional—and outrageous—remedy of a $13.4 billion budget surplus, i.e., with a calculated increase in unemployment and poverty, he did not achieve price stability, but "stagflation." The oligopoly-dominated economy did not respond according to the rules of an obsolete competitive model of capitalism. Nixon's politically motivated solution to this problem was, as we have seen, to follow inflationary policies in order to stimulate a fraudulent sense of well-being in the fall of 1972.

All of this goes to demonstrate something which Keynes knew but his disciples conveniently forgot: that there is a profoundly inflationary bias in welfare capitalism. A major big business response to this situation is extraordinarily revealing of the nature of the system as a whole. The corporations now demand that society put the claims of profits ahead of those of wages. The executive suite is to be recarpeted in the struggle against recession; the people are to have their belts tightened in the battle against inflation.

This incredible argument first emerged in the midst of the energy crisis, when the Chase Manhattan Bank, the center of a Rockefeller fortune soaked in Standard Oil, announced that the oil companies would have to invest $1 trillion between 1974 and 1985 and therefore needed to double their profits. It was generalized in the fall of 1974 by a New York Stock Exchange study which saw a $646 billion "savings gap" emerging between 1974 and 1985. In order to help the companies make up this deficit the Stock Exchange proposed the following golden strategy for big business: lower corporate taxes; increase the tax subsidies already handed out to the rich by "liberalizing" capital gains advantages; give preferential treatment to dividends from stock; permit easier depreciation; institute the investment tax credit as a permanent feature of the Internal Revenue Code.

Several things are particularly noteworthy about this fantastic program. First, the New York Stock Exchange expects that two-thirds of new investment will come, not from individual risk takers but from retained profits. Second, the people of the United States are asked to be the prime donors of "risk" capital by treating profit income as superior to wage income—that is, by lowering the taxes on profits and thereby raising the burden on the individual taxpayer. Third, this is likely to accentuate the existing trend whereby the wealthy 0.5 per cent at the top own 25.8 per cent and the bottom 20 per cent have 0.2 per cent.

This dramatically reveals the most important trends in the society. The production of wealth is increasingly social in character: it depends upon the profits of gigantic private corporations, and upon the active intervention of the government on their behalf. In the process, the unquestioned need to set aside a portion of that annual production for depreciation and new investment is presented as a matter for private corporate decisions. The business establishment is to say how much shall be set aside and where it shall be invested, as well as what golden benefits are to be provided at the public expense for those who own the corporations. This becomes particularly incredible during a period when there have been such clear demonstrations of the irresponsible and anti-social character of private priorities, i.e., when oil companies have taken moneys

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given them by the taxpayers to better the economic and strategic position of the American energy industry and used it to make this country vulnerable to a foreign cartel.

None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that a capitalist conspiracy in control of the government cynically exploits federal policy for its own advantage without meeting any resistance. Unionists and liberals have won some positions of strength in Washington, particularly under Democratic administrations, and they can influence social priorities, even if they have thus far been unable to transform anti-social structures. Moreover, though business is shrewd and employs sophisticated planning techniques, it is far from omniscient, and it would be wrong to assume that the abstraction, "capital," has an infallible class consciousness. The anti-social allocations of resources here described should be seen as a consequence of a system of economic relations which make it "natural" to act in this way, even in the absence of corporate ill will and often when conscious intentions are impeccably reformist.

So the welfare capitalism state tends—not in every case and not inevitably, since an aroused people can make a difference even though the institutional cards are stacked against them—to follow corporate priorities and thereby to create social problems in the name of solving them.

Beyond Welfare Capitalism

Given this analysis, the democratic Left, not in response to ideology but for reasons of urgent practical necessity, must proceed beyond the welfare capitalist state of 1973-74 in the direction of Socialist structural change. Here and now, of course, Socialists join with the trade union movement and other reform forces for an immediate program to counter the Nixon-Ford inflation-recession: for a public employment program guaranteeing every worker a job to be financed through an anti-inflationary closing of more than $20 billion in tax loopholes; for a fiscal policy which fights recession by meeting human needs; for a federal money policy which rations credit, not solely by the purse but also according to need (particularly in the housing industry); for trade union action, by means of strikes if necessary, to regain the buying power which has been lost during the last year and to improve the workers' standard of living.

But such a program is only a beginning. Its various components can be effective only if they are seen as first steps on the road to structural change. And that needed structural change must come, not in a vague and distant future but within the next several years. It is not a question of an ideal but of measures which are necessary and urgent if there is not to be a further, and disastrous, deterioration of the position of the great mass of Americans.

First of all, there must be a redistribution of wealth and income in the United States. There has been an "incomes policy" from the very beginning of capitalism. It never was true that an impersonal market rewarded the factors of production—labor, land and capital—according to their marginal product. From the very beginning, the government intervened, normally on behalf of the capitalists. The enormous grant of land to the railroads in the United States is an obvious 19th-century case in point. But these various incomes policies were not coherent and conscious. Even after the Keynesian shift from *laissez faire* to welfare



Uluschak, Edmonton Journal (Canada)

capitalism, the fact that the Internal Revenue Code was shifting burdens from high-income taxpayers to the middle and working classes was not at all apparent, even to those who benefited from billions of dollars worth of tax expenditures.

With the emergence of recession-inflation, however, there were more and more demands for a planned incomes policy. These usually took the form of proposals for wage and price controls, but to see the problem in that way is to limit its definition arbitrarily. There is, for example, the incomes policy urged currently by big business in the United States: preferential treatment for profits on the ground that they are the source of new investment and therefore of new jobs. This argument, as we have seen, makes a certain crazy sense as long as one accepts the right of corporations to make basic investment decisions. A serious alternative to this scandalous proposal must envision structural change in the economy: an expansion of the public sector; public participation in the "private" investment decisions by major corporations, and so on. To win democratic control of the commanding heights of the corporate sector is thus a precondition for any serious program to redistribute wealth. It is the "natural," "normal" tendency of capitalism to channel rewards to the rich and the mechanism which assures this maldistribution is precisely the ownership of corporate property. As long as that is left in private hands, it is extremely difficult to bring about any serious redistribution, since the workings of the economy will constantly nullify any redistributive decisions within the political order.

However this does not mean that no redistribution can be achieved unless the basic means of production are socialized. That is true enough in the long run, but many

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

Wetzel

transitional measures can precede the qualitative transformation of economic structure. For instance, billions upon billions of dollars of subsidies in the Internal Revenue Code reward totally unproductive people. The capital gains provisions which give enormous assistance to speculators (so long as they hold their stock a minimal period of time) is one obvious case; the lack of an effective inheritance tax is another; so are the failure to collect a minimum tax from the very wealthy and the continuation of a more and more regressive system of Social Security taxation. All of these misuses of government power can be corrected long before the fundamentals of American capitalism are reordered.

But what about an incomes policy in the form of controls? We know from the Nixon experience (and from European attempts in this area) that controls can be used against the workers and on behalf of business. That certainly is the direction in which the Ford Administration would instinctively move. Therefore, the question of controls is not simply an "economic" issue; it is a problem in political economy. In the abstract, controls are neither good nor bad. What is crucial is how they are set up—do they cover executive compensation, rents-and-profits income as well as wages—and, above all, by whom are they administered? Under the right political conditions, controls could well be an instrument of democratic Left policy, but that can be determined only by a specific examination of the details of a particular proposal and the political circumstances which surround it.

Second, controls must not be viewed as a miraculous substitute for all other policies. If, for example, we allow corporate domination of our energy allocation, with massive government subsidy, to foist the anti-social and wasteful uses of energy upon the society; if we permit agribusiness to speculate in hunger, we cannot then ask wage and price controls to deal with all the problems that these aberrations create.

Third, the Left should unambiguously proclaim itself in favor of a redistributionist incomes policy. There is no economic, political or moral reason why the Rockefeller family should command the wealth and power it now possesses. Tax reform, corporate structural reform and possibly wage and price controls should all be oriented toward distributing both money and decision-making power throughout the society. Given this analysis, the other structural measures which are noted here—and they are not exhaustive, but only illustrative—are, in addition to having their specific purposes, parts of a strategy for redistribution and against both inflation and recession.

Steps Toward Capitalism

It should now be clear that we must move toward the socialization of energy in the United States. First of all, there must be a coordinated national plan with regard to both the sources and the uses of energy. We cannot go on destructively and irresponsibly proliferating energy needs according to private priorities. That has already brought us a transportation system which has been disastrous for urban life, the poor, the minorities and the environment, to name but a few of the victims. And having allowed ourselves to get into this dangerous and shameful plight because the government acted as the effective agent of the oil companies, we cannot turn to those malefactors and subsidize their control of alternative energy technologies. What energy will be produced and how used must be publicly and democratically decided.

It is no easy task. Socialists, who are particularly aware of events in this area, do not view nationalization as a sovereign and simple remedy. They know from the European experience that nationalized industries often behave exactly like their private counterparts. Even in America, the Tennessee Valley Authority, which has provided such irrefutable proof of the efficiency and worth of public enterprise, has also demonstrated a lack of concern for the environment by encouraging strip mining. The mere transfer of ownership title from a private to a public corporation can be a technique of reaction, as Bismarck was among the first to prove. What is needed in the area of energy—and in so many other spheres of American and world life—is not alone a formal change in ownership but a substantial change in decision making as well. And that is not quickly accomplished.

If one could nationalize the entire energy industry at a single stroke, the most likely effect would be to confer governmental power on the very private executives who have produced the present miserable situation. The more prudent course is to take three first steps in an ongoing battle to win actual democratic control:

¶Establish in the executive a national energy planning mechanism whose proposals would be subject to debate and vote in the Congress.

¶Create a national gas and oil corporation to act as a yardstick and to develop new sources of energy (shale, coal, gasification and liquefaction, etc.) for permanent public ownership by the people.

¶Pass a law providing for public (consumer and employee) representatives on the boards of directors of all major American oil companies for the purpose of bring-

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ing into the open all information with regard to pricing, profits and new technology.

The allocation of food throughout the United States and the world cannot be left to agribusiness and multi-billion-dollar export corporations. There should be a national food plan, charged with expanding production and capturing surpluses in order to turn them over to an international anti-famine authority and to use them within the United States to drive down prices. All family farmers and genuine cooperatives should be guaranteed a rising standard of living to be provided, not by subsidies to curtail production and raise prices but by direct federal expenditure after the greatest possible food yield is achieved. Agribusiness should be subject to the same kind of controls that are put on the energy corporations, and the United States should explore the desirability of nationalizing at least one of the major export concerns.

In this area, as in so many others, the nation cannot arrogantly assume that it can, or should, continue to consume an enormously disproportionate share of the world's resources. It is an outrage that even as children starve in Bangladesh and Chad, millions of Americans are suffering from overweight. Barbara Ward has estimated that during the past ten years, one-third of the world's increased demand for food came, not from population increases but from stuffing by the affluent. The people of the United States use as much fertilizer on their ornamental gardens as India employs to produce food—and our pets consume a high percentage of the globe's fish protein.

Third, the assumption that the corporate infrastructure of American society is sound and should be allowed to make basic allocation decisions within a system provided, and paid for, by the government and the people is clearly false. In a federally subsidized environment, oil corporations, auto companies, food giants and the rest of big industry made disastrous choices and were handsomely rewarded by the public for the harm they did the nation.

All major corporations should be required to have public representatives on the board of directors and to make their fundamental choices in the full light of day. This should specifically include provision for democratic employee participation in decision making at every level, from the shop floor to the board room. Where companies are already primarily wards of the state—the defense corporations, the railroads—they should be taken over and managed by the state. In all cases where either public ownership or board membership is indicated, stringent requirements should be set up for the personnel who will represent the people's interest. Specifically, the commissions which monitor such operations must exclude present or former managers or major stockholders in the industry.

The power of those managers and major stockholders should be permanently abridged by the passage of tax laws which strike at wealth itself. The idea that the accident of birth confers upon a Nelson Rockefeller dominion over hundreds of millions of dollars in assets and billions in economic power is an affront to democratic values. In the "robber baron" period of American enterprise there was at least a semblance of truth in the proposition that entrepreneurs who risked their fortunes should be allowed to benefit from their investments. But in a society in which the internally generated profits of industry provide most "risk" capital and in which the government more and more assumes the responsibility for the economic direction of the society, it is preposterous to allow wealth to pass on from generation to generation. The federal tax code is one of the most important instruments for structurally altering the concentration of economic and political power.

These new policies for energy, food and the corporations are obviously only the beginning of a program which can lead America, and the world, out of the impasse in which both now find themselves. But they do illustrate a central point. The conventional wisdom of American reform, which is now forty years old, has become obsolete. A modernized, ameliorated, but still basically capitalist society cannot, even in its welfare state variant, progressively deal with the incredible challenges of the new age that has already begun. That is why the American democratic Left, even though it is not likely to move quickly to a mass Socialist consciousness, must, of immediate necesssity, move in a more Socialist direction. □



Vadillo, Siempre (Mexico)

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Nostalgia for the Gods

EDWARD MARCOTTE

Nowadays all bookstores are devoting space (usually prime space) to a type of speculative nonfiction that sometimes goes under the simple heading "von Däniken." You'll find it adjacent to—or merged with—sections on UFOs, Edgar Cayce and ESP. A respectable selection might spread over a shelf or two and feature twenty or thirty paperback titles. In appearance these books are barely distinguishable, their tabloid-headlined format imitating Erich von Däniken's international bestseller, *Chariots of the Gods?* (1968).

Here are some other titles: *Gods from Outer Space* (von Däniken's second), *The Gold of the Gods* (von Däniken's third), *Extraterrestrial Visitations from Prehistoric Times to the Present* (Jacques Bergier), *Gods and Spacemen of the Ancient West* (W. Raymond Drake), *God Drives a Flying Saucer* (R.L. Dione), *We Are Not the First* (Andrew Tomas), *The Spaceships of Ezekiel* (Josef F. Blumrich), *Not of this World* (Peter Kolosimo). The craze is international: von Däniken is Swiss, Bergier French, Tomas Australian, Kolosimo Italian, and Blumrich an Austrian working at NASA.

Sampling of the genre reveals a preoccupation with a stock of mysteries drawn from history, geography, archaeology and mythology: the Ark of the Covenant (was it an electrical generator?), the Easter Island statues (who moved them, and how?), the Baghdad batteries (evidence of advanced technology?), the Piri Reis maps (proof of ancient satellites?), strange earthworks on the Plain of Nazca in the Andes (prehistoric landing field?), etc. Regrettably this list of incontestably fascinating items is limited, and after reading two or three of these books the novelty ratio drops sharply.

Two theories are advanced:

We're not the first: thousands of years ago other civilizations developed advanced technologies, subsequently destroying themselves through misuse of powers unleashed.

The gods were astronauts: extraterrestrial visitation is the only way to explain the Pyramids, Easter Island, enigmatic Bible passages, and so forth. Thus Ezekiel's chariot was really a flying saucer, the destruction of Gomorrah a nuclear explosion set off by alien masters to punish erring mankind. By one variant man didn't evolve on earth at all but was transplanted here.

In *The Cosmic Connection* Dr. Carl Sagan admits we cannot exclude the possibility that extraterrestrials visited earth in the past, but adds that all the items cited by von Däniken "have a variety of plausible, alternative explanations." Yet Sagan himself soberly speculates on whether it is possible to "travel into the past by plunging down a black hole." "For all we know, black holes are the transportation conduits of advanced technological civilizations . . ." or "entrances to Wonderlands." Quoting *Gold of the Gods*: "Science says that it cannot accept imaginative solutions because they have no empirical or demonstrable foundation. But now serious conclusions become more and more fantastic every day. . . ."

Yet certain distinctions warrant attention. In *Science: Conjectures and Refutations*, Karl Popper claims that the pseudoscientific attitude is not only prior to the scientific but that the latter is superimposed on the former, that myths are raw material for scientific criticism. "The scientific tradition is distinguished from the pre-scientific tradition in having two layers. Like the latter, it passes on its theories; but it also passes on a critical attitude towards them." This built-in yielding to criticism enables science to promulgate fantastic conjectures without yet succumbing to fantasy.

Science is defined by method rather than any current stock of findings; this method von Däniken waives. Nothing in the idea of astronauts visiting earth and forming the basis of ancient myths is inherently unacceptable to science. What the scientist objects to are conclusions based on inadequate evidence. Such is the underlying theme of a collection of answers to von Däniken by sixteen noted scientists and scholars, *Some Trust in Chariots* (Popular Library). Unfortunately, this book suffers from its paperback publisher's desire to capitalize on the von Däniken craze, promising "to reveal the startling, irrefutable truth about ancient marvels!" Facts, by the way, are the *overt* theme here: von Däniken is repeatedly accused of getting his measurements and dates wrong, of bungling historical and archaeological facts and of inventing nonexistent facts.

Von Däniken, for his part, criticizes scientists for being "tied up in a straightjacket of preconceived views," unwilling to see evidence in front of their faces. The real conflict, I think, turns on the concept of evidence. Serious accommodation of the astronaut thesis would mean radically modifying our criteria for "evidence" and "objectivity." In effect, an altered epistemology—altered, moreover, toward what to our present assumptions should appear as mythic consciousness. Thomas Kuhn uses the image of the "Gestalt switch" to characterize the leap in vision accompanying a scientific revolution. After this "switch," Kuhn suggests, we don't simply see old facts in a new way but see new facts entirely. Von Däniken invites us to make a switch of this sort—but in a direction opposite from that in which we've been moving.

Theologians are as vehement as scientists in attacking von Däniken. Though science and empiricism have, in many respects, run religion and its gods right out of literal discourse, most theologians find God more acceptable as a metaphor or idea than as an astronaut. Curiously, religious-oriented criticism of von Däniken (a frequent Bible misquoter) often centers on scientific rather than theological grounds.

Contemporary with quasars, black holes, breakthroughs in subatomic physics, lunar landings, the Mars and Jupiter probes, the von Däniken phenomenon is a paradox: with all this going on, why such craving for pseudoscientific sensation? Maybe we're jaded, but homegrown space travel isn't turning us on in the degree expected. Myth, I'll suggest, is the primary substance of von Däniken's appeal.

In a sense *we are* a myth—those conquering lords of the cosmos. But Shepard, Armstrong and the rest are just too ordinary to rate as mythic figures, and even the all-American-boy myth—for which they *might* qualify—has been discredited by a generation of hippies. Von Däniken, with infallible instinct, makes the optimal reconciliation, locating his God theory in a hybrid region midway between the iconography of technique and that of the miraculous. The astronaut *is* the contemporary hero

Edward Marcotte has contributed literary essays to Partisan Review *and* Chicago Review.

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—but only after adjustments. Von Däniken does what theologians failed at: reclaims religious myth from its metaphoric limbo, at the same time injecting scientific matter of fact with mythic resonance. If our myths, thereby, seem to have become trashy, let's not forget that we typically see the new as trash anyway.

Science pursues objectivity to the detriment of mystification. The epic of space conquest is enacted on a field too remote and sterile to touch our sense of myth. By contrast, the God-as-astronaut thesis has the anthropomorphic features myth demands. The prospect of ancient super-technologies, native or extraterrestrial, is just about the most momentous thinkable. Nothing in our own emerging space science stirs the imagination so dramatically.

Common to nearly all such speculation (a rare exception: Velikovsky's *Worlds in Collision*), and telling, I think, is a predilection for the superhuman in terms of knowledge and power. Even the we're-not-the-first hypothesis undercuts our unique supremacy by placing us chronologically second. While the scientist may speculate on the distribution of intelligence throughout the universe (something which, even now, not all scientists are prepared to do), von Däniken asserts its direct involvement in our destiny. Connections with astrology, shamanism and spiritualism—also in current upsurge—seem more than fortuitous. The appeal of myth is the appeal of the great other. We can read in the whole syndrome a wish to submit to something greater having the attributes of a *being*. As the author of *God Drives a Flying Saucer* concludes, "There is a God after all! He can and does do what He claims, and we on earth are His subjects, inextricably involved in His experiment." Science can tell us *what* we are, but only myth can tell us *who* we are.

It can be no accident that the von Däniken phenomenon parallels in such a timely way the advent of space travel. The popular psyche has been overcome by an epidemic of acute agoraphobia, to which, we see, one way of reacting is to harness the motifs of space travel to a religious frame of reference. "The silence of those infinite spaces frightens me," remarked Pascal at the prospect of a universe in which God does not palpably figure. Pascal was reacting to another crisis in our intellectual and spiritual history, though a forerunner of the present one. "Maybe we're property," suggested Charles Fort. Von Däniken emphasizes this very proposal.

Science, for its part, proffers its own version of the *belonging* imperative: basically we're atoms undergoing natural processes—part of the cosmic order. Common structures of implication thus join the scientific world picture with the religious or mythical. But the level of joining is too abstract for a psyche which opts for *body* first of all: a host of doubles tempering the impersonal framework of being. This same need, of course, directs us to embellish star patterns into astrological bodies. Sagan calls von Däniken's artifacts "psychological projective tests," into which people read whatever they want.

The nostalgia isn't simply for vanquished gods but more fundamentally for a way of deciphering the world, of assimilating fact to concept—vanquished by scientific method some 300 years since.

Scientific reductionism is currently being assailed on several fronts (by Theodore Roszak, for example, and by Ervin Laszlo and the diverse group connected with "systems philosophy") for its sterility and narrow vision—and with some justification, I think. The epistemology von Däniken offers is suspect, however, because it *is* hybrid, a haphazard mixture of science and religion. The result is the spiritual potboiler geared for immediate sensation but weak, as any potboiler must be, in the face of long-range criticism. The gap separating science, characterized by reductionism, from religion, characterized by anthropomorphism, is much greater than we sometimes appreciate. Von Däniken isn't alone in supposing an easy reconciliation possible: many theologians and even scientists are guilty of the same delusion. Astronomers aren't going to discover God beyond the galaxies, nor will theologians accommodate science to the divine—either way means standing one or the other on its head.

The astronaut theory has, of course, two possible denouements: refutation or confirmation. In the first case the world is irrevocably purged of some of its most enthralling and comfortable mysteries; in the second our wildest speculations on those mysteries have proven all too true. I think the equal unacceptableness of both alternatives gives insight into the psychic region von Däniken illuminates, a region almost touching the fictional, balanced delicately between the factual and the visionary, and impervious to both. □

The Whole Man Minding the Store

EQUITABLE COMMERCE: A New Development of Principles as Substitutes for Laws and Governments, for the Harmonious Adjustment and Regulation of the Pecuniary, Intellectual and Moral Intercourse of Mankind, Proposed as Elements of New Society. *By Josiah Warren. Burt Franklin. (Reprint of 1852 edition.) 117 pp. $14.50.*

TRUE CIVILIZATION: An Immediate Necessity, and the Last Ground of Hope for Mankind. *By Josiah Warren. Burt Franklin. (Reprint of 1863 edition.) 184 pp. $16.50.*

JERRY RICHARD

A few years ago there were little signs posted at drugstore counters that asked how much you valued your child's life. They were placed there by the pharmaceutical industry to explain and excuse the high price of modern medicines. The point was that you should be willing to pay for drugs not according to their cost but according to their value. (No one seemed to ask how much the drug companies valued your child's life.) That is known as charging what the traffic will bear.

Josiah Warren, writing in 1852, objected to this way of doing business. In one of his examples he supposes a thirsty traveler stopping at a farmhouse for a drink of water. Generally, the farmer would offer the water without charge since its cost to the farmer is nothing or at best insignificant. If, however, the traveler were desperate enough for water to pay for it and the farmer, perceiving this, charged him $1 for a glassful, the farmer would be pricing the water not according to its cost but rather according to its value to the traveler which, as Warren said, "is the motto and spirit of all the principal commerce of the world." It was the case then and it is still the case now; in fact it is one of the reasons for the rising price of so many commodities today (genuine rising cost is the other) as scarcities, real or manipulated, raise the value of things.

The cure is obviously to restrict prices to the genuine cost of the item or service for sale. Easier said than done, no doubt, yet Warren did it. He did it first in a general store which he opened in Cin-

Jerry Richard teaches at Fairhaven College, Bellingham, Wash. He is editor of The Good Life, *an anthology of essays on alternate styles of life in 19th- and 20th-century America (New American Library).*

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AFTER GRIEF

When you woke up among them,
when you rose,
when you got up and they asked you
what you were—is it named?—
and you in your new clothes
and face and body lined dry with newspaper,

when you climbed out of the coffin
and began to walk,
alive (like a rainbow *one of them said*),
without a word, in this place of skull and femur,
stone and the sounds of water, when you walked up
to the one talking, his face a face
of the moon, and started to speak, he said

no need, I know who you are.

All this recorded in the first book, The Dream,
in the blessing of the death
of each day.

And tonight, bedded down,
the mind adrift, the body just a few feet
from the earth, it is written

there is the river,
go wash yourself.
And you asked
what is this place? *And the one*
without a face answered
look around you, this is where you are.

I remember how even near the end
you would go out to your garden
just before dark, in the blue air,
and brood over the failures
of corn or cabbage
or the crooked row
but meaning the day had once more
failed for you.

I watched you as any son watches his father,
like prophecy.

And in my mind I counted the thousand
things to say.

And tonight, again, it is written
that the one talking said
Father, forgive everything.
leave these clothes, this body,
they are nothing.
lie down in the water.
be whole.

And having done so, you rose
among them, who are called The Bones,
without flesh or face.

And rose, and rose.

Stanley Plumly

cinnati. It was called the Equity Store by Warren but became popularly known as the Time Store because the price of each item was its actual cost to Warren, plus a share of the overhead, plus a reasonable—even a modest—amount for the time Warren calculated it took him to stock the item and wait on the customer. Warren's bills and invoices were always on display so that customers could see for themselves the actual wholesale cost of the merchandise. While the cost of the goods was to be paid by his customers in money, Warren's time and labor were to be repaid by an equivalent amount of time and labor from the purchasers. In cases where the exchange of labor was inconvenient the equivalent could be repaid in corn. People were so skeptical of the idea at first that Warren had to get his brother to shop at the store in order to set an example, but when the public realized the store was real it became a great success.

Interested in expanding the principles of the store beyond the clientele he had established, Warren joined Robert Owen's intentional community at New Harmony. That experiment failed because of the disunity of the participants, but Warren came to the conclusion that individualism had better be accommodated than eliminated:

> This Individuality is unconquerable, and therefore rises above all institutions. To require conformity in the appreciation of sentiments, or in the interpretation of language, or uniformity of thought, feeling, or action where there is no natural coincidence, is a fundamental error in human legislation —a madness that would only be equalled by requiring all to possess the same countenance or the same stature.
>
> We see that, as it is both inexpedient and impossible to overcome this Individuality, we must *conform our institutions to it*!

This led to Warren's other great principle—the absolute sovereignty of the individual. He took as the only legitimate function of government the words of the Declaration of Independence, that everyone has an "Inalienable right to Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."

> Had the American public mind been educated to understand that *Individuality* is the vital principle of order, it would have generally seen and admitted that Government has, properly, but one function, which is to resist or restrain encroachments upon the rights of Individuals. That it is not the true function of governments to prescribe opinions, either moral, religious, or political; to meddle with manufactures or importations; to prescribe the cut of the citizen's hair, the employment of

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his time, or the disposal of his life is understood.

This kind of attitude seems to lead by one path to radical anarchism and by another to conservative libertarianism, but radicals and conservatives have always agreed on the ultimate principle of the least possible government. People believing in a Socialist or Communist solution to our economic problems have long been suspicious of individualism as an impediment of the collective spirit necessary to carry out their program. To the extent that individualism implies an every-man-for-himself attitude, these suspicions are well-founded, but Warren's notion is that the selfish attitude is not necessarily implied by individualism, only that the profit motive fosters it. Indeed, Warren believed that harmony and cooperation could well come out of a careful preservation of the sovereignty of the individual. If goods were exchanged at cost and labor exchanged on an equivalency basis then people would feel free to cooperate when the occasion seemed suitable—and when it did not there would not be the disappointment and hard feelings entailed by a demand for cooperation that cause it to be given grudgingly, making refusal an act of rebellion. This naturally supposes an optimistic view of human nature, but at least it does not call for change in it.

Warren believed that the "*antagonism* of interests, supposed by communists to be inherent in Individuality, is not inherent in, but only incidental to it." Operating with free will and according to the principle of "Equivalents," people will naturally cooperate when their interests harmonize, as they often would. The *understanding*, as well as the hands, should cooperate." Although Warren does not discuss it, none of his proposals precludes the possibility of government or any other agency trying to convince people that their interests do in fact harmonize in some particular or another; that would give government an educative function, but if persuasion failed Warren would clearly not grant the right of coercion. In any case, forced cooperation only leads to the building up of grudges and dissension which are potentially explosive.

Again, Warren tried out his ideas in practice, founding an intentional community on Long Island known as Modern Times. It lasted from 1853 to 1857—not bad for earthly utopias then or now; and it was undone much more by external forces than internal ones, a fate of which relatively few communities could boast. In this case it was the depression of 1857 which proved a crippling blow to the industry of Modern Times, still necessarily dependent to a large degree on the economy of the rest of the country. Warren had envisioned a series of such communities, and had they existed they might have created an alternative economy and become more self-sufficient.

It was said of Modern Times that it was reachable "by railroad or rainbow," and it seems to me still a toss-up whether Warren's ideas are thoroughly practical or hopelessly impractical. Certainly they were more feasible in a society of yeoman farmers and itinerant tradesmen, in which cottage industry could still compete with the factories just being established. But if individual ownership of many industries is no longer feasible, an alternative economy of considerable extent in which Warren's ideas would be apposite may still be possible. If, for instance, a grocery store owner were willing to trade with a bookstore owner on a strictly cost basis, they would not only enjoy a mutual advantage in the price of goods but they would also discover the good feeling of not exploiting each other. Indeed, as Warren suggests, it would then be to their mutual advantage to find ways to reduce each other's costs and in that way cooperation is fostered. One paradoxical result is that competition under such conditions becomes a power-

A quick quiz on American socialism:

What is the DSOC?

☐ **A.** A dynamic new group dedicated to rebuilding a socialist presence in American life, led by Michael Harrington and including in its membership: Ralph Helstein, Victor Reuther, Alice Rossi, Irving Howe, Cynthia Epstein, and Sanford Gottlieb.

☐ **B.** A socialist organization which works within the existing liberal-Left, with trade unionists, feminists, black activists and other reformers fighting to win victories right now. A group, unlike other past and present socialist organizations, which works within the Democratic Party's left wing.

☐ **C.** Publisher of a monthly *Newsletter of the Democratic Left*, edited by Michael Harrington, featuring incisive articles on the energy crisis, the food shortage, the general economic calamity, and timely reports from feminists, trade unionists and other Left activists around the country.

☐ **D.** All of the above.

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☐ I'd like to join the DSOC. Enclosed find my dues for one year ($15 regular dues, $8, limited income; dues include a subscription to the *Newsletter of the Democratic Left).*

☐ I'm not ready to join, but I would like to subscribe to the *Newsletter.* Enclosed find my subscription ($10 sustaining rate; $5 regular subscription; $2.50 limited income subscription).

☐ Send me more information about the DSOC and democratic socialism.

☐ Send me details about the DSOC's second convention, January 25 and 26, at the Commodore Hotel in New York City.

Name .....

Address .....

City ..... State ..... Zip .....

Answer: D

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ful weapon for furthering Warren's system:

> Competition is an element of society so well known and understood, that no illustration is necessary to show that where one person will deal more for the interest of the public than another, he will get all the business, or others must come to his prices, and that in this position one person can wield an immeasurable power.

In those areas where it is not possible, or at least not at all likely that prices can be reduced to costs (which includes a reasonable amount for personal income), Warren's basic idea still has some applicability. In fact, it is often said these days that no one knows how to control inflation, but the formula, as Warren would have said, is obvious: separate price from value. Inhibit the practice of charging what the traffic will bear and inflation will be inhibited as well. This can be done by restricting prices to costs plus a reasonable, fixed percentage. Of course this would require some policing, but so do many other activities in our society. It would be necessary, for instance, to see to it that costs were not padded. There could in fact be some sort of bonus system for reducing costs, as long as this were not done by further exploiting workers. Would this reduce the incentive to produce and so create shortages? First of all, it seems to be our present system that has created shortages (where these shortages are not natural, that is, due to depletion of resources) by making it possible to drive up prices as a result of the shortage. Secondly, since only the percentage of profit would be restricted, not the total amount, the incentive should be to increase production.

Josiah Warren differed from most of the other social dreamers of his age in looking to individualism rather than some form of collectivism as the key to a better world, and his institutions were more successful than were those of most of his contemporaries. One of the nice things about his ideas is that it takes only a few people to begin putting his theories to work; another is that it requires no forceful overturn of the present institutions of society. That is why he called his newspaper *The Peaceful Revolutionist* and why his books deserve to be reintroduced into today's political discussions. □

Doing Well by Doing Good

CORPORATE POWER AND SOCIAL CHANGE: The Politics of the Life Insurance Industry. *By Karen Orren. The Johns Hopkins University Press. 232 pp. $10.*

HARVEY D. SHAPIRO

One of the bench marks on the bourgeois path to settling down is passed when we give in to the entreaties of some distant cousin or lodge brother and buy some life insurance. That is pretty much the first and last time that most of us think about this ancient and arcane industry. Probably few of the 140 million Americans covered by life insurance have pondered the use made of their premium payments or have considered that the nation's 1,800 legal reserve life insurance companies have accumulated assets of $240 billion.

Nearly 95 per cent of the industry's assets are composed of investments, including vast quantities of stocks and bonds. But insurance funds have long been especially prominent in real estate investing.

The downtown of virtually every major city is host to a Prudential or Hancock or Equitable building, and insurance companies have also built giant housing developments like Parkchester in New York and Lake Meadows in Chicago; they have financed center city redevelopment projects like Gateway Center in Pittsburgh and Stuyvesant Town in New York, as well as many of the giant suburban shopping malls and apartment complexes that surround major cities. Insurance funds have even helped build complete new towns like Columbia, Md.

While reformers from Andrew Jackson to Ralph Nader have cast jaundiced eyes on the banks, the nation's life insurance companies have seldom been perceived as anything other than somewhat stodgy places with a benignly selfish interest in our good health and longevity. Yet the Prudential Insurance Co. and Metropolitan Life have assets of more than $30 billion each, making them two of the four largest financial institutions in the world, and a dozen other life insurance companies have assets of more than $1 billion.

The men who run these companies and the investment decisions they make have an important impact on the way we live, yet Karen Orren, an assistant professor of political science at UCLA, is one of the few scholars to have examined them. Her book, a revised version of her doctoral dissertation, is a somewhat disjointed study of political stratagems and investment practices of life insurance companies in Illinois.

Professor Orren argues that "autonomous control of the assets" has been the life insurance industry's "principal objective." In order to avoid any mandatory allocation of their investments, the life insurers have staved off federal control in favor of regulation by the states; they have played off the states against one another by threatening to move their assets; and finally, they have done an effective job of politicking within the various states.

The industry has gotten its way in Illinois, she notes, by maintaining low visibility and cultivating the belief that life insurance is too complex for popular discussion. Thus the industry has managed to carve out a narrow arena in which policies are considered, and there it does a good job of lobbying for its wishes.

It is aided by warm relations with the state insurance department that is supposed to be regulating it and with the 20 to 25 per cent of the members of each house of the Illinois legislature who list selling insurance as their means of livelihood—making it second only to the practice of law in popularity.

As a result, in Illinois, as in most states, insurance investment regulations seek to protect the solvency of the companies rather than promote any broader social goals. And Professor Orren argues that, since most of the largest life companies are mutual companies, owned by policyholders who have shown little interest in the activities of management, these giant pools of capital tend to be run by self-perpetuating groups that can invest premium dollars in pursuit of maximum return while paying little heed to the social implications of their investments.

Focusing her research on the residential mortgage lending activities of insurance companies in the Chicago area, Orren shows statistically that "black tracts were virtually cut off" from insurance mortgage money until the mid-1950s, while even more recently black communities have lagged far behind white areas in access to insurance funds. Though insurance executives claim that blacks generally have been too poor to qualify for mortgages and their neighborhoods too risky, she shows

Harvey Shapiro, a writer and consultant on economics and public affairs, recently received an award from the University of Missouri for "excellence in reporting the American economy."

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Unlike the Watergate team, the operatives for the secret bombing did not bungle away their potential for harm. Thousands of irregular orders were obeyed like clockwork--as people falsified their records and burned their secret orders when they

(more)

We'll get back to those secret orders momentarily. First, about that parenthesis . . .

When journalists reach the bottom of a manuscript page, they type "(more)" to indicate that their story is still not complete.

Yet even after that final page is written, there's usually a good deal left unsaid.

That's where [MORE] comes in. [MORE] is a magazine that picks up where the rest of the media leave off. Each month it offers

- an insider's look at the nation's news organizations and how they work—and often don't work
- profiles of the men and women who wield the power to keep you informed—and often uninformed
- analyses of news coverage that informs our daily lives—and often fails to

Which brings us back to those secret orders. What author Taylor Branch, writing in a recent issue of [MORE], reported after the parenthesis was that "people falsified their records and burned their secret orders when they were supposed to, so that the B-52's could do their work without making any noise back home. . . . No one could have known, because the Administration didn't talk and the press didn't snoop very hard."

Taylor Branch went on to compile a carefully documented, damning indictment of how and why the media missed the Cambodia story. It typifies the tough-minded scrutiny readers have learned to expect of [MORE] each month.

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
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that white areas receive more financing than black areas with comparable income levels. She concludes that the real estate investment standards and criteria employed amount to a form of institutional racism.

Following the urban riots in the summer of 1967, the life insurance industry announced a billion dollar "Urban Investment Program" to begin funneling money into the inner city. Orren revives the dubious argument that this program resulted from a need to bail out the beleaguered property insurance companies; in fact few of the major life companies had what she calls "brothers and subsidiaries" in the property insurance field at the time. Nor were the life insurers protecting their own real estate investments, since as she demonstrates, they generally eschewed the neighborhoods in which the civil disorders occurred. Orren is on much firmer ground when she argues that the Urban Investment Program is another attempt to co-opt any efforts to require mandatory allocations of insurance investment funds.

In making inner city investments, insurers weren't exactly throwing caution to the winds, since many of their loans were guaranteed or insured by the federal government. Even so, she notes, "The habits of underwriting channeled funds straight to the most profitable or peripheral segments of the ghetto community." And she concludes that corporate concern for autonomy and profit must constrain such voluntary efforts and restrict the extent to which they can operate in a way responsive to social needs. But large corporations were not designed to be branches of the Sisters of Charity: they have been created and guided by a single-minded devotion to making money, and it is not clear that they have either the will or the skill to seek other goals, nor that we would necessarily be better off if they did so.

Hopes of amending business and investment decision-making procedures so as to include some sense of "corporate social responsibility" rely on a doctrine that is troublesome as a theory and elusive in practice. After World War II, for example, the life insurance industry was widely commended for its social responsibility in choosing to finance the development of vast quantities of new housing. But it has since become clear that these investments created the suburban tracts which enabled whites to flee the blacks who were crowding into major cities.

In many ways social responsibility is a latter-day revival of *noblesse oblige*, which legitimizes corporate power by requiring it to be used benevolently. This doctrine has sometimes superseded the old faith that market competition and shareholder control would serve as a check on corporate managements. None of these doctrines has been very reassuring, but neither has the experience with governmental allocation of financial resources. In the case of funds for housing, the FHA's mortgage policies have been as racist as any private lender's, and public housing has achieved segregated residential patterns on a scale larger than any private developer could imagine.

The questions raised by the social consequences of business decisions are complex and the alternatives are problematic. Perhaps this is why Orren seems hard put to reach much of a conclusion. In any case, her book trails off after raising some interesting issues.

Despite its limited vision, the book is useful to those who are not knowledgable about life insurance investments. Those who are will be troubled by the book's many errors, however. Contrary to the opening paragraph, for example, the Urban Investment Program wasn't announced solely by the Life Insurance Association of America (LIAA), but rather was a carefully orchestrated joint undertaking of the LIAA and another major trade association, the American Life Convention. Her errors are small things, but their occurring at all—together with frequently off-key uses of accounting and insurance terms, suggests that the author is not very well versed in the industry she is studying. Still, she ought to be given a good deal of credit for bothering to inquire whether we're really in good hands with Allstate. □

THEATRE

HAROLD CLURMAN

Though parody is not a theatrical mode especially attractive to me, I found *London Assurance* (Palace Theatre) surprisingly good fun. I enjoyed it more here than when I first saw it late in its London run three years ago. The cast is better in one of its parts (Polly Adams as Grace Harkaway), and the company in general seems to have perked up—at least it plays somewhat more broadly for the benefit of us yokels.

The Dublin-born Dion Boucicault wrote it in 1841, at the age of 19. It was his first play and initiated a career which extended to 1890, during which time he contrived some 150 plays for the London and New York stages. Most of them were hugely successful in both towns. Boucicault, who was also an actor, was a hack with a knack close to genius.

The element that still gives *London Assurance* life is a subject forever timely: the thoroughly metropolitan fop utterly at a loss in rural surroundings. When asked if he ever rose with the sun to hear the song of the lark, his look of alarm and consternation is that of a person unwarrantedly slapped in the face.

Such humors, and others which deal with town and country types often delightfully struck off, would probably not appear sufficiently fresh to present New York audiences if they were not done so hilariously by the Royal Shakespeare Company. Donald Sinden, immense in height and weight, corsetted to a becoming slimness, bewigged, rouged, weak in the knee, with loose and "whistling" gestures, endowed with a sonorous voice and the capacity for super-articulation acts Sir Harcourt Courtly. His characterization of this 60-year mirror of fashion in quest of a well-dowered country heiress is a triumph of comic ham. Another of my favorites among the men is Sydney Bromley as a dotard made lovable by absent-mindedness. As his wife, the gusty Lady Gay Spanker, fond of horse and mischievous adventure, Elizabeth Spriggs brings the vigor of the wind and the rain of England's open spaces, and the appetite they stimulate, to full fruition. But everyone in the cast is some one to relish in this display of old-time shenanigans.

Peter Ustinov has a matchless gift for imitating every kind of foreign accent; he is accordingly richly entertaining as a Soviet general in his play *Who Who in Hell* (Lunt-Fontanne Theatre). But his facility for political palaver and his proficiency with stage devices sometimes deceive him, as they do in this case, into thinking that they suffice to make a play. The quips about the absurdities of Soviet and American pretensions and the general chaos of contemporary society occasionally provoke laughter—Ustinov can turn a phrase and knock off an epigram—but they all evaporate as quickly as they are pronounced. They are like the small talk of bright people who speak without conviction because they lack any real contact or concern except to pass an idle hour at a party or a bar.

Terence Rattigan, in his *In Praise of Love*, eliminates his theme even as he seeks to illustrate it (Morosco Theatre). What is supposed to be dramatized in this play is the propensity of the English to cover up even their deepest feelings emotions. Is it truth or cliché, or both? On this question, some are inclined to say that the English have little emotion to suppress. Others maintain that under certain forms of pressure the English be-

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come hysterical. Still others hold that because social form obliges the English to keep their upper lip stiff, their poets leave their country, but also that, because of it, England has produced many great poets. Then too there is the possibility that this special trait, called the "English vice" in the play, may have become more prevalent in England after Elizabeth I and especially marked since Victorian days.

But no such discussion would be generated by Rattigan's new play. It deals with a rather atypical individual, Sebastian Cruttwell, an eminent literary critic who avows himself an "unfeeling shit." But we do not believe even this self-defensive description because we can believe very little in the play. He is not a person, only a role. While a member of the British intelligence service during the war he came to know an Estonian girl who had been a resistance fighter, victim of both Nazi and Soviet brutality, and married her so that she might obtain a British passport and entry into the country. As his wife, she has served him hand and foot, borne him a son and only when, after twenty years together, he learns that she is about to die of an incurable disease does he become conscious of loving her.

The dramatic nub of the play is that both husband and wife try to hide knowledge of the woman's doom from each other. At the end they both realize that each knows of its imminence so that they need not speak of it at all and may thus continue to live "normally" in silent understanding and mutual devotion.

This undoubtedly contains material for a moving play, but Rattigan avoids what he is purportedly talking about by making a smooth comedy of it with inventitious stage dressing—the woman's foreign origin, her heroic escape from the Nazi firing lines and many jokes about the critic's self-absorption, his ineptitude at all manual tasks and his treatment of his (still adoring) wife as a maid of all work. The situation, in short, is stated but never confronted. The treatment proceeds from the blandly engaging to the undisturbingly sentimental without a fiber of living matter being plucked. There is glib conversation, a smattering of facile sophistication and lightweight acting opportunities—but no drama.

What makes the evening tolerable is the professionalism of the cast. Rex Harson is thoroughly deft in this sort of theatre. Martin Gabel, who plays an American writer of horrendous bestsellers, the critic's friend who is also in love with his wife, characterizes all aspects of his part with discreet particularization. Julie Harris, very comely, manages the foreign accent neatly, but seems mannered because the part is without substance except as "information": we are *told* about her vicissitudes but we see nothing of them in either the writing or in the acting. If we did, it would be another play.

David Rabe's *Boom Boom Room*, which I praised when it was produced last spring at the Vivian Beaumont Theatre, has now been revived and revised at the Public Theatre on Lafayette Street. I could not discern the extent or the exact nature of the revision. The play still strikes me as a rather crude but very real piece of writing, angry and cruel, but true to the life of people at the bottom of the social heap—which means a very considerable portion of our population. The picture is not pretty but also not without pathos and general relevance. Rabe's major fault, here as before, is that he is not sufficiently self-critical: he piles detail upon detail so that he takes the edge off many of his most effective scenes. In a word, he won't cut. Rabe should take to heart the advice of Otto Brahm (Germany's pioneer director of realistic drama): "What's cut, can't flop."

The new production gains by intimacy in the smaller house and suffers by making the faults of the script and the staging more glaring. The director understands the play's central character, Chrissy, the go-go girl, well enough, but he forces Ellen Greene, an actress not without a beginner's talent, to extremes of emotional stress which she cannot sustain or make intelligible. The multiplication of climaxes is discomfiting and leaves the impression of amateurishness.

Still, David Rabe is one of the best of our new playwrights, an angry young man whose anger is more than a pose. Through hurt, he has earned the right to his indignation. □

DANCE

NANCY GOLDNER

As a structural device, and perhaps too as a metaphysical affirmation of the possibility to sum up and tie together, the finale is dead. No one wants to be called a neoclassicist in thought or deed. Nowadays, not even a self-respecting musical can end with a finale, unless it intends to capture the "nostalgia market," or, like *Candide*, derives from the age of reason. Balanchine doesn't know that this is the year of nostalgia, so he keeps working in the sonata form and creating finales as though they were the latest development in aesthetic hardware. He inherits the tradition of the finale in part from the latter half of 19th-century Russia and its chief choreographer, Petipa. The links are in the steps and in the intent to be the entertainment of all entertainments. Structurally, however, and possibly in certain of their metaphysical underpinnings, his finales are pure 18th-century exercises. The game is to build a maze and end up in a clearing, the assumption being that one can get to the clearing only by going through the maze. The trick,

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of course, is to build the maze correctly, and that means formula.

The most recent Balanchine finale belongs to the third and final act of divertissement of the New York City Ballet's old-new *Coppelia* (the old—Act II and part of Act I—having been staged by Alexandra Danilova, who herself learned the ballet from a Russian *émigré régisseur*). Like all of Balanchine's finales, but most like the one for *Harlequinade*, its direct antecedent, and also the remake of an older Russian ballet, the *Coppelia* finale sums up, ties together, entertains you (sometimes to smithereens), and works like the perfect formula-fed machine. First of all, it *works*. Although the entire cast is whooshing by in a panoply of pattern, dancer A's left shoulder is always there as a guidepost for dancer B's right shoulder, snaking lines collaborate neatly with straight lines, and somehow or other a giant merry-go-round that threatens to jam breaks into a semi-circle just in time for a higher echelon of dancers to pace one another in galloping turns. Second, the finale is comprehensible to the eye. If the stage has the feel of a giddy street party, it has the look of a beehive. Each category of dancer, from friends of Swanilda and Frantz to the couple themselves, is introduced separately before they are jumbled together; and even then a pecking order is maintained. The steps are fast and furious, naturally, but they cluster around one family of movement whose nucleus is the prancing *emboité* (lock step). (As an example of link-ups to the past, Petipa used the *emboité* in *The Sleeping Beauty* to mark the transfer from private, formal marriage rite to community celebration. Balanchine uses it in *Coppelia* to mark the same transfer, but it has also become a symbol of identity with the past.)

Finally, it is possible to anticipate the dancers' paths of movement and to grasp the entire picture in one eyeful. It is possible, that is, until the end, when Balanchine overthrows one of his tactical rules—that climactic moments must file by singly—and springs on us a double-header. When Swanilda dashes alongside a hedgerow of village friends and makes a running dive into Frantz's arms in the near left corner of the stage, you figure that this must be *the* pinnacle of the preceding movements. Not so. At the very second of Frantz's catch, all the children and the adult soloist from the Waltz of the Hours variation bound in from the diagonally opposite corner, as though shot from a cannon. The moment has the exhilarating shock of a Hitchcock jump shot, yet it is only a platform for another thrill. En masse, the children and their madly spinning leader make a beeline for Frantz and Swanilda and seem to be headed for an awful collision, a vision of the great machine gone beserk, when suddenly they U-turn and yaw toward their niche on stage right. And that takes us right into the clearing, a short spell of unison dancing, with the hero and heroine in their proper eminence at stage center.

The *Coppelia* finale is a culmination of what has gone before. The dances leading up to it do not have that distinction, but they do have all the compositional finesse and sensitivity to overall design that is characteristic of Balanchine. Two of them fall just short of clicking: Susan Hendl's Spinner dance, whose family of steps is too close to those of Dawn to make an impact; and the Jesterettes dance, whose musical intricacies have the makings of an intellectual gem but whose dance impetus gets sidetracked by those same intricacies. Two of the dances are true inventions. In Prayer, Christine Redpath moves at half-hidden angles to the audience in an allegorical fantasy on the private, modest nature of prayer. (Unfortunately, the cut of her costume suggests that she is pregnant.) For Merrill Ashley's Dawn, Balanchine has found a new way to suggest the hummingbird's mid-flight pause. She alights from a jump on pointe and on bent knee, but instead of hopping off pointe on the rebound, she perches for a split second, freezing an ephemeral moment. (The cut of *her* costume is merely matronly.) Balanchine has also devised a novel way to cushion the variations. The first of them, the Waltz of the Hours, is for twenty-four children who then remain on stage as convertible frames for the other variations, readjusting their groupings and arm movements to complement the soloists' dances. In the Spinner dance the children mimic with their arms the whirring sounds in the Delibes score; they become the arbor through which Ashley makes her entrance; they support Redpath in her final pose in arabesque. Their absence from the stage during the *pas de deux* for Swanilda and Frantz also has functional value. In all ballets the *pas de deux* is the figurative clearing of the decks and still point. In *Coppelia* the idea is built into the libretto. The duet is called Peace, and it follows on the heels of Discord and War. Keeping the children offstage gives Balanchine an additional way to underline the duet as, quite literally, the quiet after the storm, as Frantz and Swanilda's one moment of privacy and our one experience of them as adult lovers.

He keeps the children as gainfully employed while they are onstage. While some may contend that the joyousness of Act III cruelly undercuts the pathos of Act II, everyone, I think, must be touched by the humaneness with which Balanchine choreographs for children. They are presented as dancers, no more and no less, and like the adult dancers are given steps that bring their skills into full play, comfortably, attractively and interestingly. (Unfortunately, the designer of their stiff, pink, petal-laden tutus dehumanizes them into miniature marionettes.)

The dark side of *Coppelia*'s story has dissipated, temporarily I hope, since the first performances at Saratoga last July. In most contemporary productions, Dr. Coppelius is batty and senile, easily consigned to the status of fall guy for Swanilda's heartless tricks. Balanchine and Shaun O'Brien conspired to make the doctor and thereby the whole story more complex. The Saratoga Coppelius was as mocking of the villagers as they were of him. Frantz's belief that the doll Coppelia is real was proof of his stupidity, as far as Dr. Coppelius was concerned. The revelation that, at bottom, Coppelius was also deeply in love with Coppelia, so much so that he let himself be duped by Swanilda's impersonation of the doll into believing that he had really brought her to life, was a rigorous lesson on the power of will and the conflict between rational and irrational instincts. O'Brien's exquisite mime and acting unearthed all of Coppelius' gentleness, pride and vulnerability as well as cynicism and alienation, and he damn near stole the show.

At the first performance at the State Theatre, on November 21, O'Brien's mime was still full-bodied, but he played Coppelius more for laughs, not stooping to the ploy of senility but not engaging our sympathies to the extent that we had learned to ask of *Coppelia*. Is it pure comedy or dark comedy? At Saratoga the last act of divertissement was no less joyous than now, but it had the additional interest of answering the question about *Coppelia*'s ultimate nature and meaning. It came down heavily in favor of pure comedy, and in so doing could express a moral position: reality is better than make-believe, real love better than idealized love; idealists get their just deserts. At the State Theatre the last act had no side to favor and so no judgments to make. One had to be with Swanilda all the way, all the time. With Patricia McBride's Swanilda such a delicious package of spice, inquisitiveness, courage and endearing determination to get her man, that is a sensible way to be—just not the most interesting.

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Crossword Puzzle No. 1566

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

and 23 down Did the rest of the doll, as they say, get broken by a long-awaited court procedure? (8,6)
Should chowder be so wet and sticky? (6)
With a twisted root, and unlikely during those halcyon days. (7)
and 29 What Alden kept for himself might be demanded by the judge. (7,2,5)
As a form, it describes itself as being aged. (5)
A book might be, as well as a writer who applies himself. (9)
Ruthless was certainly what she didn't intend to be! (5)
The make-up of the poet Alfred? It's an equivocal answer! (3,3,2)
Puts starch in suits coming back to the lowlands? (8)
Cupid's nourishment, according to *Twelfth Night*. (5)
Perhaps scales for what the athlete sometimes does. (9)
Women sometimes consider it frilling. (5)
The first note on the piano version should be perfect! (7)
See 11 across
Doodle, perhaps, like one of nine in New York. (6)
Exhausted. (8)

DOWN

A mechanic might do it more than once on your car, but you'll find it more than once with a match. (3,5)
2 Acted like a human being, as they say. (5)
3 A simple quarrel may result in a participant's being one. (9)
4 A bad time for anyone but an Englishman! (7)
6 Olive's family embraces it. (5)
7 One would never give them the air! (9)
8 Gives up financial returns. (6)
9 Other parts are not supposed to hear them. (6)
15 Having a good time at local expense? (2,3,4)
17 Figures to be so? (9)
18 Received with favor. (8)
20 Less enemies for the religious man there? (6)
21 In one case we have a religious point about it. (Sigh!) (7)
23 See 1 across
25 Sounds like a way to rise in an old-fashioned country. (5)
27 Make a 17 progression in the nobility. (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1565

ACROSS: 1 By degrees; 10 October; 11 Tab; 13, 12 and 17 Turn State's Evidence; 15 Lie awake; 16 Studio; 18 Mascot; 20 and 30 Overseas trade; 23 Lalo; 24 Nordic; 25, 6 across and 9 The worse for wear; 28 Goshawk; 29 Nearing; 31 Pretenses.
DOWN: 1 Befit; 2 Durable; 3 Greasewood; 4 Earmarks; 5 Smoker; 6 and 27 With care; 7 Rebound; 8 Erroneous; 14 Stern chase; 15 Limelight; 19 Silesia; 21 Entries; 22 Mockup; 26 Edges.



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